1. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

D. Judicial Recourse and Review

• Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction
• Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
• Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, emphasis supplied). (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, [April 18, 1990], 263 PHIL 352-360)

Courts will respect the sense-making a.k.a. primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered. [Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, G.R. No. 77663, [April 12, 1988], 243 PHIL 93-135]

Courts must allow specialized competence of administrative agencies through Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba, March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." [Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, G.R. No. 77663, [April 12, 1988], 243 PHIL 93-135]

Courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative agency to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the court, even if the matter is within the jurisdiction of a court. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990)

Exceptions to the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:

• where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
• where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
• where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
• where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
• where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
• where judicial intervention is urgent;
• when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
• where the controverted acts violate due process;
• when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
• when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
• when strong public interest is involved; and
• in quo warranto proceedings. (Aklan v. Jody King Construction & Development Corp, G.R. No. 197592, 2013)

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction does not apply in a case seeking to enjoin the Senate Committee from conducting further hearings against Senator Villar on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. (Pimentel v. Senate, G.R. No. 187714, 2011)

The Supreme Court may defer to the competence and expertise of the SEC if there are supervening events which could have substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case while it was pending before the Court. (Nestle v. Uniwide, G.R. 174674, 2010).

Under Section 53 of the Securities Regulation Code, the SEC investigates reported violations and, upon finding a violation, refers the matter to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution. (Republic Act No. 8799, Section 53; Manuel v. Baviera, G.R. No. 168380, February 8, 2007).

It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. (Cabungcal v. Lorenzo, G.R. 160367, 2009)

The court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction motu proprio and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it, as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties. In such a case, the court may (1) suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view, or (2) if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case w/o prejudice. (Euro-Med Laboratories Phil. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. 148106, 2006)

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not an ironclad rule. An exception to this rule is where there is already estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine. In this case, the Puerto Princesa LGU neither objected to the RTC’s jurisdiction over the money claim filed by Company X nor did it invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the COA over the money claim. In fact, it even actively participated in the proceedings. Moreover, after the RTC decision became final and executory, Puerto Princesa did not even avail of the remedies under the Rules of Court to assail the RTC’s jurisdiction such as an annulment of judgment under Rule 47. Hence, Puerto Princesa is already barred by laches from invoking the primary jurisdiction of the COA. (Star Special Corporate Security Management, Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 225366, J. Leonen, September 1, 2020)

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

General Rule: An administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. It is a condition precedent that must be complied with. (Sps. Sadang v. CA, G.R. No. 140138, 2006)

Non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would result in lack of cause of action, and consequently, the dismissal of the case. (Ejera v. Merto, 725 Phil. 180, 2014). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for judicial review. It is a condition precedent which must be complied with.