4. Collateral Attack on Judgments

MODES OF ATTACKING FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS

A party may seek relief from a judgment under Rule 38 when it was entered against the party through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

An action to annul a judgment under Rule 47 may be based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. A denial of due process may support annulment when it renders the judgment void.

A direct petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be brought for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A judgment that is void on its face may also be challenged collaterally; that challenge is distinct from a Rule 65 petition.

(Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. 2, 2013 Ed., p. 109)

Extrinsic Fraud

Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. (Libudan vs. Gil, G.R. No. L-21163, 1972)

(Example: preventing a witness from testifying).

Note: Compare with intrinsic fraud – Intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. (Libudan vs. Gil, G.R. No. L-21163, 1972)

Example: use of forged instruments or perjured testimony).

For the next three grounds: The ACCIDENT, MISTAKE, and EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE must be something which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the party applying has probably been impaired in this rights. (De Leon, Appellate Remedies, 2013, p.21)

Collateral attack of judgments

A collateral attack upon a judgment has been defined to mean any proceeding in which the integrity of a judgment is challenged, except those made in the action wherein the judgment is rendered or by appeal, and except suits brought to obtain decrees declaring judgments to be void ab initio. (15 R.C.L., 838); (Alviar vs. Carlos, G.R. No. L45291, 1937)

In case of collateral attack, the principles that apply have been stated as follows: “The legitimate province of collateral impeachment is void judgments. There and there alone can it meet with any measure of success.

Decision after decision bears this import: In every case the field of collateral inquiry is narrowed down to the single issue concerning the void character of the judgment and the assailant is called upon to satisfy the court that such is the fact. To compass his purpose of overthrowing the judgment, it is not enough that he show a mistaken or erroneous decision or a record disclosing non-jurisdictional irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the judgment.

He must go beyond this and show to the court, generally from the fact of the record itself, that the judgment complained of is utterly void. If he can do that his attack will succeed for the cases leave no doubt respecting the right of a litigant to collaterally impeach a judgment that he can prove to be void.” (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 322, p. 642.); (Barretto vs. Barretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-5549, 1954)

Note: In the case of Sps. Benatiro, the CFI (RTC)'s order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside. (Sps. Benatiro vs. Heirs of Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, 2008)

Q: Through the lower court’s final and executory Decision dated January 25, 1961 in Civil Case No. 2146, the respondents X were recognized as the co-owners of the subject property, being the co-heirs of the intestate estate of the spouses V. The Declaration of Heirship unilaterally executed by Y, which adjudicated the subject property unto the latter alone, was nullified. As a result, the subject property was partitioned among all the heirs in the proportion of 1/9 each. Despite full knowledge of the foregoing, the petitioners Z entered into a supposed verbal agreement with Y, asking the latter to execute all the necessary documents to facilitate the complete transfer of possession and control of the subject property to the petitioners Z on the basis of the pacto de retro sale entered into by their predecessor-in-interest of Z with Y. The petitioners Z subsequently filed an action for specific performance for the execution of the alleged oral contract covering the subject property in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97). It is not disputed whatsoever that the petitioners Z, despite knowing fully well that respondents X were adjudged to be the co-owners of the subject property, failed to implead the latter. Eventually, in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97), the RTC rendered its Decision dated September 21, 2001 in favor of the petitioners Fernandos. Not having been impleaded, the respondents X naturally did not file an appeal and the aforesaid Decision in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) became final and executory, thus compelling the respondents X to file their Petition for Annulment of Decision under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA, which was granted by the latter in the assailed Decision and Resolution. Did the CA erred in granting the petition for annulment?

A: No. The Petition for annulment grounded on lack of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the indispensable parties, "is ample basis for annulment of judgment. Well settled that the joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In this case, it goes without saying that in an action for specific performance compelling the transfer of the subject property co-owned by nine heirs who have already been adjudged by a final and executory decision as co-owners of the subject property, the latter are indispensable parties in such an action. Jurisprudence has indubitably held that in a suit involving co-owned property, all the co-owners of such property are indispensable parties. Moreover, According to jurisprudence, an annulment of decision may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. It must be stressed that the respondents X were not able to avail at all of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or any other remedy against the RTC's Decision in Civil Case No. 31- SD(97), not due to their own fault or negligence, but precisely because they were not impleaded by the petitioners Fernandos. Hence, considering the foregoing, the CA did not err in granting the respondent X’s Petition for Annulment of Judgment. (Fernando v Paguyo, G.R. 237871, September 18, 2019)

Q: Heirs of X filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47, wanting to annul the judgment of RTC granting the petition for reconstitution of the lost owner’s duplicate of OCT of Y. This owner’s duplicate OCT is the one Y successfully acquired after his request before the RD to issue a new OCT on the basis of a document denominated as “Confirmation of Previous Sale” (CPS) whereby Sps. X allegedly sold Lot A which cover’s 1,266 sqm. to Y’s father. Using the new owner’s duplicate OCT issued by RD, Y was able to segregate a 135- sqm portion from Lot A. Having been informed that Y would use CPS to transfer title the rest of Lot A, Heirs of X filed for case wanting to annul the CPS and the new owner’s duplicate OCT issued to Y. This was dismissed by RT for lack of jurisdiction. Upon appeal, CA denied Heirs of X’s petition for lack of merit. This decision became final and executory. Meanwhile, Y filed a petition for reconstitution of lost owner’s duplicate of the OCT alleging that when his mother requested for the owner’s duplicate OCT for purposes of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father, Y could not found it in his cabinets. RTC granted the petition and ordered RD to issue a new owner’s duplicate copy of OCT. This decision also became final and executory. Heirs of X now the present petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47, wanting to annul the judgment of RTC granting the petition for reconstitution of the lost owner’s duplicate of OCT of Y. Heirs of X cited Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 26 which requires that the petition for reconstitution shall be filed by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property but they were neither included as petitioners nor notified and this shows Y’s illicit desire to appropriate the entire lot. Heirs of X further allege that Y did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements R.A. No. 26 thus: 1) proof of publication of the petition; 2) proof of posting of the petition; 3) name of the registered owner; 4) names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property; 5) names of the owners of adjoining properties and all other interested persons; and 6) the date when persons having interest must appear and file their objections to the petition. Do the Heirs of X, being the successors-ininterest of the registered owners of the subject property, should be considered interest parties that should have been notified of the Petition for Reconstitution?

A: Yes. Section 109 of PD 1529 contemplates a situation where when an owner's duplicate certificate of title is lost or destroyed, a person who is a transferee of the ownership over the property, who is not necessarily the registered owner, may also file the petition for reconstitution. In this situation, the registered owner must also be duly notified of the proceedings. By his or her very status as registered owner, the latter is an interested party in the petition for reconstitution case. This is pursuant to the legal presumption that the registered owner is the owner of the property, thus affording him preferential right over the owner's duplicate, duly notifying him would prevent a person who wrongfully purports to be the owner of the property to commit fraud. It would offer the registered owner sufficient opportunity to contest the supposed interest of the person filing the petition for reconstitution. The rule on the mandatory notification of the registered owner in a petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate certificate filed by another person who is not the registered owner is to ensure an orderly proceeding and to safeguard the due process rights of the registered owner. It prevents the commission of fraud. Therefore, being the registered owners of the subject property, the Sps. Ramirez, whose rights are now transferred by succession to the petitioners Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez, should have, at the very least, been given sufficient opportunity to be heard in the Petition for Reconstitution. (Heirs of Spouses Ramirez v. Abon, G.R. No. 222916, July 24, 2019.)

Direct attack distinguished from collateral attack

A DIRECT ATTACK against a judgment is made through an action or proceeding the main object of which is to annul set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment, if not yet carried into effect; or, if the property has been disposed of, the aggrieved party may sue for recovery.

A COLLATERAL ATTACK is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made as an incident in said action. This is proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null and void, as where it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has no jurisdiction. (Co vs. CA, G.R. No. 93687, 1991)