3. Disputable Presumptions

Disputable Presumptions

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but they may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

There is no constitutional objection to a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and declaring what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence. The legislature may provide for prima facie evidence of guilt provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. (Vallarta v. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-40195, 1987) Thus, the prima facie presumption of guilt in Article 217, Revised Penal Code, is valid (Bacasnot v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 60884, 1987).

The following are DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS:

• That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
• That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
• That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;

A person is equally liable for all the consequences arising from his criminal act, and which are inherent therein; for example, such complications as may arise and which are not due to circumstances ompletely foreign to the act committed, or from the fault or carelessness of the injured party (U.S. v. Monasterial, G.R. No. L-5098, 1909)

• That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
• That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;

In order that the presumption in par. € may arise, it is necessary:

• That the evidence is material (Cuyugan v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-208, 1947);
• That the party had the opportunity to produce the same (People v. Balansag, G.R. No. L-41568, 1934); and
• That the said evidence is available only to said party (People v. Tulale, 97 Phil. 953 [unreported case]).

The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence does not arise when:

• the suppression is not willful;
• the evidence withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative;
• the evidence is at the disposal of both parties, and
• the suppression is an exercise of a privilege (People v. Navaja, G.R. No. 104044, 1993).
• That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
• That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latte
• That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid
• That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produce

See, in connection with par. (i), the provisions of Art. 1176, Civil Code, which also lays down the presumption that interest has been paid if the principal is received by the creditor without reservation. (Regalado, p. 823)

• That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her;

The application of this disputable presumption is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. (People v. Urzais, G.R. No.207662, 2016; Panaligan v. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 2020886, 2017)

• That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
• That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
• That official duty has been regularly performed;
• That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
• That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
• That private transactions have been fair and regular;
• That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
• That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
• That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
• That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
• That a writing is truly dated;
• That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;

For the presumption to arise, it must be proved that:

• The letter was properly addressed with postage pre-paid; and
• That it was actually mailed (Barcelon, Roxas Securities v. CIR, G.R. No. 157064, 2006)

If said letter was not returned to the sender, it is presumed that it was received by the addressee (Sebastian v. WCC, et al., L42587, 1978).

• That after an absence of seven (7) years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he or she is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his or her succession until after an absence of ten (10) years. If he or she disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five (5) years shall be sufficient in order that his or her succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:

• A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has not been heard of for four (4) years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
• A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four (4) years;
• A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four (4) years; and
• If a married person has been absent for four (4) consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two (2) years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

There are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

• The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (Family Code, Art. 41)
• The present spouse wishes to remarry;
• The present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and
• The present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. (Republic of the Philippines v. Nilda B. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, 2016)
• That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
• That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits of life;
• That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of co-partnership;
• That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
• That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
• That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares, including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit, are equal.
• That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
• A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
• A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
• That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
• That the law has been obeyed;
• That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published;
• That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
• That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him or her when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his or her successor in interest;
• That, except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
• If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
• If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
• If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
• If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; and
• If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.

In order that the presumption of survivorship in par.

• may arise, it is necessary that (a) the deaths occurred in a calamity, and (b) there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one died ahead of the other. Thus, regarding the third rule, if one is a one-day old child and the other is 61 years old, it cannot be presumed that the one-day old child survived, in view of the second requirement. (Regalado, p. 830)
• That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.

Par. (kk) may be distinguished from the rule in par. (jj) as, in the former, it is not required that the parties perished in a calamity and, furthermore, it only applies in questions of successional rights. The rule in par. (jj) applies only where the deaths occurred during a calamity and applies to cases not involving successional rights, e.g., in insurance cases. Furthermore, par. (kk) provides a presumption of simultaneity in the deaths of the persons called to succeed each other, while par. (jj) provides for presumptions of survivorship. (Regalado, p. 831)

Some Disputable Presumptions Explained:

• Presumption of innocence– Applies to criminal cases.

Section 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Art. III, Sec 14(2), 1987 Constitution)

EQUIPOISE RULE:

Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule. Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. (People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, 2008)

• A person takes ordinary care of his concerns

All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be moved by substantially the same motives.

When of age and sane, they must take care of themselves. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. There must be a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.

Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them — indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Valles v. Villa, G.R. No. 10028, 1916)

Exception: When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former (Civil Code, Art. 1332)

• Possession of stolen goods

This is not in conflict with the presumption of innocence. At the start of the criminal case, the court will apply the presumption of innocence. But once the prosecution is able to prove that a certain object has been unlawfully taken, that there is a crime of theft committed and that the prosecution has also proven that the accused is in possession of this object unlawfully taken, and then the presumption of innocence disappears. The new presumption of guilt takes its place.

The doctrinal rule is that before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, the following basic facts need to be proved by the prosecution, viz.:

• the crime was actually committed;
• the crime was committed recently;
• the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and
• the accused is unable to satisfactorily explain his possession thereof.

For purposes of conclusively proving possession, it is necessary that:

• the possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin;
• the possession must be fairly recent; and
• the possession must be exclusive (Mabunga v. People, G.R. No. 143039, 2004).

On this score, the Supreme Court has theretofore taken the stand that convictions in cases involving the foregoing assumptions are not actually sustained upon a presumption of law but rest wholly upon an inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. (U.S. v. Catimbang, G.R. No. 11750, 1916)

On a rationale similar to that of the presumption in par. (j), it has been held that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taken advantage of it and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification (People v. Sendaydiego, et al., L-33252- 54, 1978 and cases cited therein).

• A person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it

REASON - It would cause great inconvenience if in the first instance strict proof were required of appointment or election to office in all cases where it might be collaterally in issue. The burden of proof is on the adverse party to show that he was not appointed or designated.

• An official duty has been regularly performed REASONS
• Innocence and not wrongdoing is to be presumed;
• An official oath will not be violated;
• A republican form of government cannot survive unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each government, department, or agent at least to the extent of such presumption. (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 1994)

Jurisprudence on Disputable Presumptions

• A certificate of stock is a written instrument signed by the proper officer of a corporation stating or acknowledging that the person named in the document is the owner of a designated number of shares of its stock. It is prima facie evidence that the holder of the certificate of stock is a shareholder of a corporation. (Teng v. SEC and Ting Ping Lay, G.R. No. 184332, 2016)
• The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. (Central Mindanao University v. Republic, G.R. No. 195026, 2016)
• Notarization creates a presumption of regularity and authenticity of the document. This presumption may be rebutted by strong, complete and conclusive proof to the contrary. While notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document concerned, it does not give the document its validity or binding effect. When there is evidence showing that the document is invalid, the presumption of regularity or authenticity is not applicable. (University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 194964-65, 2016)
• There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in a Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate with more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. (Poe-Llamanzares, v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 2016)
• “Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability.” While it is true that where the complainant presents a copyright certificate in support of the claim of infringement, the validity and ownership of the copyright is presumed. This presumption, however, is rebuttable and it cannot be sustained where other evidence in the record casts doubt on the question of ownership, (Olano v. Lim Eng Co, G.R. No. 195835, 2016)
• Manuel's birth certificate, a public document and an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar, enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity. To defeat these presumptions, the party making the allegation must present clear, positive and convincing evidence of alteration. For obvious reasons, this burden cannot be discharged by the mere submission of an inconclusive report from the Senate Committee and the presentation of an excerpt of an NBI report on the purported alterations. (Republic v. Harp, G.R. No. 188829, 2016)
• Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court identifies the following as disputable presumptions:
• private transactions have been fair and regular;
• the ordinary course of business has been followed; and
• there was sufficient consideration for a contract. A presumption may operate against a challenger who has not presented any proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. In this case, because of Atanacio, affixing his signature on the deed of absolute sale, there arose a disputable presumption that consideration was paid. A mere allegation that no payment was received is not sufficient to dispel such legal presumption. Furthermore, the record shows an official communication, dated October 8, 1958, from the District Land Office of Cebu to the Provincial Treasurer of Cebu stating that Provincial Voucher No. 05358 was disbursed in favor of Atanacio. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Unchuan, 2016)
• Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. (Cruz v. Agas, G.R. No. 204095, 2015)

Under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain:

• the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
• the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and
• the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. (Geromo v. La Paz Housing and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 211175, 2017)