b. Specific Instances of Vicarious Liability

E. Vicarious Liability (Civil Code, art. 2180; Family Code, art. 211)

E. Vicarious Liability (Civil Code, Art. 2180; Family Code, Arts. 218–219, 221)

Vicarious liability is a legal doctrine that holds one party responsible for the actions or omissions of another party. In other words, an employer or principal can be held liable for the wrongful actions of their employees or agents, even if they did not personally commit the wrongful act themselves.

This principle is based on the idea that an employer or principal has the power to control and direct the actions of their employees or agents, and therefore should bear the responsibility for any harm caused by their actions. The theory is that the employer or principal benefits from the actions of their employees or agents and should therefore bear the risks associated with their activities.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY: OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND ENTERPRISES

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. [NCC, Art. 2180(4)]

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. (BAR AREA)

Liability of Hospital in Cases of Medical Negligence

The court has applied the doctrine of agency by estoppel to hold hospitals liable for the negligent acts of physicians based on:

• The hospital holds the physician out as its agent.
• The patient relies on that representation in accepting the physician’s services.

The case of PSI v. Agana pronounced that the doctrine of corporate negligence is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hopial liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of respondeat superior or apparent authority.

The theory supporting the liability of hospital is based on the recognition that the hospitals stand to benefit from the business of providing services to patients and should therefore be responsible for any injury or damage that may result under the relationship. (Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, 2007)

Owners and managers

The terms “owners and managers” are used in the sense of “employer” and do not include the manager of a corporation who himself is just an employee. (Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., G.R. No. L-25142, March 25, 1975)

To make the employer liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC, it must be established that the injurious or tortious act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. (Marquez v. Castillo, G.R. No. 46237, September 27, 1939)

NOTE: A corporate manager who is merely an employee is not personally liable under Art. 2180 solely because the manager supervises the employees; a separate basis for personal liability must be established.

One who hires an independent contractor but controls the latter’s work is responsible also for his negligence. (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison co., G.R. No. L-32774)

Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of the Establishment under Article 2180(5) (BAR AREA)

GR: It is required that the employee must be performing his assigned task at the time that the injury is caused.

XPN: However, it is not necessary that the task performed by the employee is his regular job or that which was expressly given to him by the employer. Liability still requires an employer–employee relationship and a showing that the employee acted within the scope of assigned tasks; benefit to the employer alone is insufficient under Art. 2180 of the NCC. (Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992)

NOTE: It is not required that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry or work. (Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999)

Liability of Joint Tortfeasors

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (NCC, Art. 2194) Each is liable as principal, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Ruks Konsult and Construction v. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corp., G.R. No. 204866, January 21, 2015)

Liability of the owner of a vehicle in case of an accident (BAR AREA)

In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. (NCC, Art. 2184)

Q: Jesmariane Reyes was hit by a van owned and registered by Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. Bautista who was employed as the driver of Caravan, was found to be grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. Reyes’ aunt, Abejar, presented a copy of the Certification of Registration of the van which attests to Caravan’s ownership thereof. Caravan argues that it cannot be held liable since Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista acted within the scope of his assigned tasks when the accident occurred.

Is Caravan liable as employer of Bautista?

A: YES. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. The registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle. In cases where both the registered owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit Reyes. The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule, a presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180, which it failed to do. (Caravan Travel And Tours International, Inc. V. Ermilinda R. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016)

OWNER/EMPLOYER

To make the employer liable under Art 2180 (5 and 6), it must be established that the injurious or tortious act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

NOTE: A personal deviation may take an employee outside the scope of assigned tasks; whether it does depends on its purpose and circumstances, including its connection to the employer’s business (Civil Code, Art. 2180).

When a criminal case is filed against the offender, before the employer’s subsidiary liability is exacted, there must be proof that:

• They are indeed the employer of the convicted employee;
• The employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
• The crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
• That the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004)

NOTE: The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment. (citing Calang v. People, 626 SCRA 679, 2010)]

Liability of Hospital in Cases of Medical Negligence

The Court has applied the doctrine of agency by estoppel to hold hospitals liable for the negligent acts of physicians based on:

• The hospital holds the physician out as its agent; and
• The patient relies on that representation in accepting the physician’s services.

Car owner not present in the vehicle

If the car owner is not present in the vehicle and the driver was negligent, the injured party may still sue the said owner under Article 2180 par. (5) of the New Civil Code for imputed liability.

NOTE: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. (NCC, Article 2180 par. 5)

Remedies of the injured party in pursuing the civil liability of the employer for the acts of his employees

• If he chooses to file a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code and succeeds in proving the negligence of the employee, the liability of the employer is primary, direct and solidary. It is not conditioned on the insolvency of the employee. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 118069, November 16, 1998)
• If the employee is finally convicted of a felony committed in the discharge of his duties, the employer’s liability under Article 103 of the RPC is subsidiary and may be enforced upon proof that execution against the employee cannot satisfy the civil liability, subject to the other requisites of Article 103. The employer cannot use as a defense the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

NOTE: Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, is subsidiary liable, if it is shown that the commission thereof was in the discharge of the duties of the employee. A previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana could not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability required by Art. 103 of the RPC. (Jocson, et al. v. Glorioso, G.R. No. L22686, January 30, 1968)

When the employee is considered to be acting within the scope of employment

An employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. (Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266, December 21, 1999)

However, evidence that by using the employer’s vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties, supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.

Employer’s Liability under Art. 2180, NCC v. Employer’s Liability under Art. 100, RPC

Employer’s Liability under Art. 2180, NCC v. Employer’s Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103, RPC

Q: Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for P1M. Benjamin took the vehicle but did not register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son Carlos, a minor who did not have a driver's license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal in a bakery. On the way, Carlos driving in a reckless manner sideswiped Dennis, then riding a bicycle. As a result, he suffered serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a criminal complaint against Carlos for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

• Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father Benjamin for damages based on quasi-delict?
• Assuming Dennis' action is tenable; can Benjamin raise the defense that he is not liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name?

A.

• YES. Dennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father for damages based on quasi-delict there being an act or omission causing damage to another without contractual obligation. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the act or omission punished by law. An action based on quasi-delict is no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately. (Sec. 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court)
• NO. Benjamin cannot raise the defense that the vehicle is not registered in his name. His liability, vicarious in character, is based on Article 2180 because he is the father of a minor who caused damage due to negligence. While the suit will prosper against the registered owner, it is the actual owner of the private vehicle who is ultimately liable. (See Duavit v. CA, G.R. No. L29759, May 18, 1989) The purpose of car registration is to reduce difficulty in identifying the party liable in case of accidents. (Villanueva v. Domingo, G.R. No. 144274, September 20, 2004)

Q: A driver of a bus owned by company Z ran over a boy who died instantly. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the driver. He was convicted and was ordered to pay P2 Million in actual and moral damages to the parents of the boy who was an honor student and had a bright future. Without even trying to find out if the driver had assets or means to pay the award of damages, the parents of the boy filed a civil action against the bus company to make it directly liable for the damages.

• Will their action prosper?
• If the parents of the boy do not wish to file a separate civil action against the bus company, can they still make the bus company liable if the driver cannot pay the award for damages? If so, what is the nature of the employer's liability and how may civil damages be satisfied?

A.

• YES, their action will prosper. The liability of the employer in this case may be based on quasi-delict and is included within the coverage of independent civil actions. It is not necessary to enforce the civil liability based on culpa aquiliana that the driver or employee be proven to be insolvent since the liability of the employer for the quasi-delict committed by their employees is direct and primary subject to the defense of due diligence on their part. (NCC, Art. 2176; NCC, Art. 2180)
• YES, the parents of the boy can enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case against the driver. The conviction of the driver is a condition sine qua non for the subsidiary liability of the employer to attach. Proof must be shown that the driver is insolvent. (RPC, Art. 103)

Actual Tortfeasor is Not Exempted from Liability

The minor, ward, employee, special agent, pupil, students, and apprentices who actually committed the delictual acts are not exempted by the law from personal responsibility. They may be sued and made liable alone as when the person responsible for them or vicarious obligor proves that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, or when the minor or insane person has no parents or guardians. In the latter instance, they are answerable with their own property. (Pineda, 2009)

OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES

The applicable law is Article 2184 of the NCC, which provides that in motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months."

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code.

It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914) 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.

In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.

The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. (Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968, 135 PHIL 400-408)

Liability of 3rd Persons to the Principal

• In Contract the agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the third person with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving that person sufficient notice of his powers. (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1897)
• In Tort the third person’s liability to the principal, insofar as the agent is involved in the tort, arises in 3 situations:
• Where the 3rd person damages or injures property or interest of the principal in the possession of the agent
• Where the 3rd person colludes with the agent to injure/defraud the principal
• Where the 3rd person induces the agent to violate his contract with the principal to betray the trust reposed upon him by the principal.

Requisites of vicarious liability of the parents (21-CL)

• The child is below 21 years of age;
• The child Committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice of another person; and
• The child Lives in the company of the parent concerned whether single or married.

Minors v. Incapacitated Persons

Thus, under Article 221 of the Family Code, there is no more alternative qualification as to the civil liability of parents. The liability of both father and mother is now primary and not subsidiary. (Libi vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992) Otherwise stated, their responsibility is now simultaneous, and no longer alternative.

NOTE: Under RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 15 years of age or younger – age of absolute irresponsibility.

Liability of parents involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children; Primary NOT Subsidiary

Primary and Solidary Liability:

• Under Article 2180 of the NCC

The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of the said Code, which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case, the unemancipated child living in their company and the parents who jointly exercise parental authority under Article 211 of the Family Code, are solidarily liable, subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law under Article 221 of the Family Code. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “the responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned proved that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. (Libi vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992)

• Under Article 101 of the RPC

The parents are, and should be, held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. Under Section 6 of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, children 15 years of age or below, and children above 15 but below 18 years of age who acted without discernment, are exempt from criminal liability; this exemption does not extinguish civil liability, for which Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 221 of the Family Code provide the applicable bases. With regard to unemancipated minor children above 15 but below 18 years of age who acted with discernment, parental civil liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 221 of the Family Code. (Libi vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992)

NOTE: Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (FC, Art. 221)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY: GUARDIANS

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company (NCC, Art. 2180). If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (NCC, Art. 2182)

NOTE: The rules on vicarious liability of parents are applicable to vicarious liability of guardians.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY: TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF ARTS AND TRADES

Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

In the case of Ylarde v. Aquino, G.R. L-33722, July 29, 1988, the teacher Edgardo Aquino, after bringing his pupils to an excavation site dug by them, left them all by themselves, and one of the pupils fell into the pit. The teacher acted with fault and gross negligence because a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

Application of vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the NCC not limited to schools of arts and trade

The application of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code is not limited to schools of arts and trades.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. There is no reason why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. (Amadora v. CA, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)

NOTE: Although Art. 2180 is applicable to all schools, the distinction between an academic school and an establishment of arts and trades is still essential to distinguish the liability of the teacher from that of the head of the establishment.

Liability of the teacher as distinguished from the head of the establishment

GR: Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student.

XPN: In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.

In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.

Basis of the teacher’s vicarious liability

They are acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However, teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. (Amadora v. CA, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)

Rationale of vicarious liability of school heads and teachers

The rationale of school heads and teachers’ liability for tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” This is provided for under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code and Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Age of student immaterial

Even if the student has already reached the age of majority, the liability can be imputed to the teacher-in-charge. Under Article 2180, age does not matter. Unlike the parent who will be liable only if the child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student regardless of the age of the student liable. (Amadora v. CA, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)

Limitation to the liability of teachers and heads of Schools

Teachers and Heads of schools may be liable while students are under their custody, including during authorized activities outside school premises. Leaving the premises alone does not end that custody; for purposes of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, custody turns on actual control and influence (Family Code, Art. 218; Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988). If school custody has ended, parental liability must be determined under the applicable requirements of Article 221 of the Family Code or Article 2180 of the Civil Code; it does not arise merely because the student left the premises.

A student is in custody of the school authorities

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school, whether within its premises or during authorized activities outside its premises, and whether the semester has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present, and in a position to prevent it.

Article 218 of the Family Code v. Article 2180 of the New Civil Code

Liability of the school

• Vicarious liability as an employer under Art. 2180 of the NCC;
• Direct liability:
• for quasi-delicts under Art. 2176 of the NCC;
• as an institution exercising special parental authority over minor children under Art. 219 of the FC;
• for breach of contract; or

NOTE: When a student enrolls, a contract is entered into between him and the school. Under this contract, the school is supposed to ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere conducive to study and ensure the safety of the student while inside its premises. (Saludaga v. FEU, G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008) A school may incur contractual liability if an employee’s act or omission breaches the school’s obligations under the enrollment contract; this is distinct from liability in quasi-delict under Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the NCC.

• An employer engaged in an industry may be subsidiarily liable under Art. 103 of the RPC for a felony committed by its servant, pupil, workman, apprentice, or employee in the discharge of duties, when the requirements for subsidiary liability are established. A school is not liable under that article merely because the offender is its student.