B. Equal Protection

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposing a penalty one degree higher than that provided in the RPC for acts committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies was assailed for violating equal protection. The Court upheld the section and explained that Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. There exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 18, 2014)

Disbursement Acceleration Program

The DAP was challenged as “unfair as it [was] selective” because the funds released under the DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail themselves of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. The Court held that the challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The requirement was not met here. (Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

RH Law

The RH Law, in providing that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program, does not violate the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. 204819, April 8, 2014)

Doctrine of Relative Unconstitutionality

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.

This doctrine was invoked in a case to invalidate the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, which started as a valid measure of legislative power applicable to Central Bank employees, but, with the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank and file employees of all GFIs from the Salary Standardization Law, was rendered void on account of a violation of the equal protection clause. (Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004)

Suspect Classification

A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. (Serrano v. Gallant, G.R. No. 167614, Mar. 24, 2009)

A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. (Zomer Development Co. v. Special 20th Division of the CA, G.R. No. 194461, Jan. 07, 2020)

Juridical entities cannot be considered a "suspect class." Juridical entities enjoy certain advantages that natural persons do not, such as limited liability. The properties of juridical entities are also often used for commercial purposes. In contrast, the properties of natural persons are more often used for residential purposes. They are also directly responsible for the liabilities they incur and, often, are not equipped with the same resources that juridical entities may have. Juridical entities, thus, cannot be considered a "suspect class." (Zomer Development Co. v. Special 20th Division of the CA, G.R. No. 194461, Jan. 07, 2020)

Scope

Natural and juridical persons. However, the equal protection clause extends to artificial persons only insofar as their property is concerned.