1. Moral Damages

Kinds of damages (MENTAL)

• Moral
• Exemplary damages
• Nominal
• Temperate or moderate
• Actual or compensatory
• Liquidated

Civil liability for moral negligence

There is no civil liability for moral negligence. A person is required to act with prudence towards others, but not with charity; the law imposes diligence and not altruism. Hence, the failure to make sacrifices or egoism does not constitute a source of liability. (Tolentino, 1987)

Illustration: Absent a legal duty to act, merely failing to rescue a drowning person or the victim of an accident does not, by itself, create civil liability. Liability may arise when a statute, prior conduct, or another legally recognized circumstance imposes a duty to assist. (3 Colin & Capitant 826)

While a person can be absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. The failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009)

Breach of Promise of Marriage

GR: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

There is no provision in the NCC authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

Exception: When the act constitutes one where damages pursuant to Art. 21 of the NCC may be recovered and is not a mere breach of promise to marry, such as:

• Where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)
• Where one formally sets a wedding and go through and spend for all the preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony was about to be solemnized. (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964)
• Where the woman is a victim of abduction and rape, and thereafter the accused promised to marry her to avoid criminal liability but later reneged on his promise. (Buñag, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992)

A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. But where a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that the promise was only a deceptive device to inveigle her to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)

Q: Soledad a high school teacher used to go around together with Francisco who was almost ten (10) years younger than her. Eventually, intimacy developed between them after Soledad became an underwriter in Cebu. One evening, they had sexual intercourse in Francisco’s cabin on board M/V Escaño, to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. After a few months, Soledad advised Francisco that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Later their child was born. However, subsequently, Francisco married another woman. Soledad filed a complaint for moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. May moral damages be recovered for breach of promise to marry.

A: NO. It is the clear and manifest intent of our law-making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry. Francisco is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he was approximately 10 years younger, and a mere apprentice pilot when he became intimate with the 36-year old complainant, who is a highly enlightened former high school teacher and a life insurance agent but, also, because, the Court of First Instance found that, complainant “surrendered herself” to Francisco because, “overwhelmed by her love” for him, she “wanted to bind” “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. (Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)

NOTE: To constitute seduction there must be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction.

Intentional Non-Physical Harms

• Violation of personal dignity

Under Article 26 of the NCC, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

The violations mentioned in Articles 26 and 2219 of the NCC are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.

In the case of Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, there is no question that private respondent suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous and insulting language. (Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000, 381 PHIL 90-101)

• Violation of Privacy

Under Article 26 of the NCC, every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

• Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
• Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
• Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
• Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Generally, denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions (Madera vs. Lopez, L-37105, February 10, 1981, 102 SCRA 700). The term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause (Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363, 365)

As observed by Chief Justice Fernando, the expenses and annoyance of litigation form part of the social burden of living in a society that seeks to attain social control through law. (Dioquino vs. Laureano, L-25906, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 65, 72 citing Petroleum Exploration vs. Public Service Commission, 304 US 209)

A long catena of cases supports the proposition that moral damages are not recoverable for unsuccessful suits filed in good faith. (Equitable Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66070, October 31, 1984, 218 PHIL 135- 142)

• Infliction of emotional distress

Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.

Moreover, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:

• The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
• The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
• There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and
• The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. (MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, 444 PHIL 230-308)
• Malicious prosecution

Malicious prosecution is when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime and the accused is compelled to defend himself in court. While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause. (Martires v. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, February 17, 2005)

A tort action for malicious prosecution has been defined as “an action for damages brought by one against another who maliciously and without probable cause instituted a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding against the former, after that proceeding terminated in the former’s favor.”

This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:

• the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement;
• the underlying proceeding finally ended in favor of the plaintiff; where the proceeding was a criminal action, an acquittal satisfies this requirement;
• in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
• the prosecution was impelled by legal malice — an improper or sinister motive.

The award of damages arising from malicious prosecution is justified if and only if it is proved that there was a misuse or abuse of judicial processes. (Tan v. Valeriano, G.R. No. 185559, August 2, 2017)

In the case of Manila Gas Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that in order to constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30, 1980, 188 PHIL 582-597)

• Defamation

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, 444 PHIL 230-308; Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 159813, August 9, 2006, 498 SCRA 298)

• Fraud or Misrepresentation

As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald, where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 512 PHIL 818-851)

• Seduction

In the case of Pe v. Pe, the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.

Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. (Pe v. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962, 115 PHIL 186-191)

• Unjust dismissal

In the case of Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Inc, the Court ruled that although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated Article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in Article 2219, No. 10. (Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 157 PHIL 757-761)

• Violation of rights committed by public officers

Under Article 27 of the NCC, any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

In addition, under Article 32 of the same Code, any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person under the said Article, shall be liable to the latter for damages.

MORAL DAMAGES

It includes physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. (NCC, Art. 2217)

Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission, the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. (Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005)

It is awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., G.R. No. L-33836, March 16, 1987; Fernando v. Northwest Airlines, G.R. No. 212038, February 8, 2017)

NOTE: In a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, moral damages may be recovered upon proof of the injury and its causal connection to the wrongful act; gross negligence amounting to bad faith is not required. In contrast, moral damages for breach of contract require fraud or bad faith. (NCC, Arts. 2217, 2219(2), 2220; Villanueva v. Salvador, G.R. No. 139436, January 25, 2006)

Q: Rosalie Sy Ayson discovered that the FilEstate and Fairways illegally entered into her property when it constructed its golf course. Despite receipt of a notice to vacate said property, the latter still continued to encroach the subject land. On the other hand, Fil-Estate and Fairways contend that it was in good faith in constructing the golf course. It contended that a certain Villanueva, the former owner of the subject land, gave assurances that Ayson will agree to a land swap which will be mutually beneficial for the parties. Ayson thereafter filed a complaint for damages. Assuming that the case will prosper, what kind of damages is she entitled to?

A: Ayson is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for public good if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Here, Ayson can recover moral damages as she was made to suffer sleepless nights and mental anguish because her right as the owner of the subject lot was violated by Fil-Estate in constructing its golf course on Ayson’s property. She is also entitled to exemplary damages since despite the notice to vacate, the latter still proceeded to construct its golf course. (Rosalie Sy Ayson v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. et.al., G.R. No. 223254, December 1, 2016)

NOTE: Moral damages apply both to natural and juridical persons. Moral damages are generally not awarded in favor of a juridical person, unless it enjoys a good reputation that was debased by the offending party resulting in social humiliation. (ABS-CBN v. CA, 301 SCRA 589)

GR: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.

XPN: A corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages. (Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al., G.R. No. L-22973, January 30, 1968; Herman Crystal, et. al. v. BPI, G.R. No. 172428, November 28, 2008)

NOTE: In cases of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation under item 7 of Article 2219 (NCC):

This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v. AMEC-BCCM, G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005)

Q: BNL Management owned six (6) condominium units at the Imperial Bayfront Tower Condominium. BNL Management, through its president Romeo David (David), wrote a letter to raise their concerns. It stated therein that if problems remain unresolved, it will withhold all future payments of association dues until the issue are resolved satisfactorily. Sevilla sent a letter to BNL Management containing a breakdown of its arrears in the payment of association dues. BNL Management received the Second Notice of Billing informing it of its pending arrears representing unpaid association dues. The Second Notice also contained a warning that after a third notice had been sent, the Association would terminate utility services. BNL Management received the Third Notice of Billing, still, did not pay the arrears. Because of this, the Association's Board of Directors, who are the respondents herein, resolved to disconnect the electricity and water services in the six (6) units owned by BNL Management. This prompted BNL Management to file a Complaint against Uy, et al. for damages. Is BML Management entitled to moral damages?

A: NO. Petitioner BNL Management, being a corporation, is not entitled to moral damages. There is no standing doctrine that corporations are, as a matter of right, entitled to moral damages. The existing rule is that moral damages are not awarded to a corporation since it is incapable of feelings or mental anguish. Exceptions, if any, only apply pro hac vice. There is no showing here that an exception should apply pro hac vice in favor of petitioner BNL Management. (BNL Management Corporation and Romeo David v. Reynaldo Uy, Rodiel Baloy, Atty. Lualhati Cruz, Alberto Wong, Teresita Pasia, Roland Ingel, And Marissa Sevilla, G.R. No. 210297, April 03, 2019)

Q: Mabunay who is a seafarer was hired by Sharpe Sea. One day after boarding the ship, Mabunay slipped and hit his back on the purifier, while he was cleaning the second floor of the engine room. Mabunay then informed 2nd Engineer Castro who advised him to continue with his assigned duties. Despite the persistent pain in his back and numbness in his legs, Mabunay continued working for 3 days, until Chief Engineer Manuel De Leon allowed him to have a medical checkup when the ship docked in Nanjing, China. He was diagnosed with chest and spinal bone damage and was declared unfit to work. He was then repatriated to Manila. Mabunay reported to Sharpe Sea office and was told to report to its company designated physician. Mabunay underwent surgery and was discharged from the hospital. Mabunay filed a complaint against Sharpe Sea for the payment of medical expenses, total disability benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees. LA ruled in favor of Mabunay. NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. MR was filed. In its MR, Sharp Sea attached the medical report showing the findings of the company designated physician. The medical report showed that Mabunay is diagnosed of Grade 8 disability. The NLRC pointed out that while Dr. Cruz's medical report might not have been presented before the Labor Arbiter, it was not disputed that Mabunay was under the care of Dr. Cruz from the time he was medically repatriated. Whether Mabunay is entitled to moral and exemplary damages when Sharp Sea withheld the company physician’s medical report showing that he was diagnosed of Grade 8 disability.

A: YES. Mabunay is entitled to moral and exemplary damages because Sharp Sea was found to be in bad faith. Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence. "It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud."

SC ruled that by not timely releasing Dr. Cruz's interim disability grading, petitioners revealed their intention to leave respondent in the dark regarding his future as a seafarer and forced him to seek diagnosis from private physicians. Petitioners' bad faith was further exacerbated when they tried to invalidate the findings of respondent's private physicians, for his supposed failure to move for the appointment of a third-party physician as required by the POEASEC, despite their own deliberate concealment of their physician's interim diagnosis from respondent and the labor tribunals. (Sharpe Sea vs. Mabunay Jr., G.R. 206113, November 6, 2017)

Act or omission must be with bad faith

For a breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Other grounds for moral damages are governed by the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, including Art. 2219. (Yamauchi v. Suñiga, G.R. No. 199513, April 18, 2018)

Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud; it is a question of intention, which can be inferred from one’s conduct and/or contemporaneous statements. (Peralta v. Raval, G.R. No. 188467, Mar. 29, 2017)

NOTE: Unless there is a clear showing of malice or bad faith or gross negligence, a public officer is not liable for moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of duties. (Rebadulla v. Rep. of the Phils., G.R. No. 222159, Jan. 31, 2018)

Elements required for recovery (BAR AREA)

• An injury clearly sustained by the claimant;
• A culpable act or omission factually established;
• The claimant’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury must be the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission; and

NOTE: Where bad faith is an element of the particular claim for moral damages, the claimant must establish it; bad faith is not required for every ground under Art. 2219; it is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. (Ong Bun v. Bank of the Phil. Islands, G.R. No. 212362, March 14, 2018)

• The award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Art. 2219. (Amado v. Salvador, G.R. No. 171401, December 13, 2007)

Updated: Moral damages for mental suffering caused by death are recoverable under Civil Code Article 2206(3), apart from the grounds discussed for contractual claims (Soriano v. Intestate Estate of Bryan G. Diano, G.R. No. 277496, 20 January 2026).

Court given discretion to determine moral damages

Trial courts are given discretion to determine moral damages and the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive “so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.” (Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., G.R. No. 184315, November 25, 2009)

Moral damages are not punitive in nature. There is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. (PNB v. CA, G.R. No. 116181, January 6, 1997; Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano v. Hon. Edelwina Atubig-Pastoral and Apolinario Serquina, Jr., G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005; Michael Guy v. Raffy Tulfo, et. al., G.R. No. 21303, April 10, 2019)

When victim bearing a child

An award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. The damages recoverable by the parents of an unborn child are limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss. (Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961)

Recovery of moral damages

GR: To recover moral damages, the plaintiff must allege and prove:

• The factual basis for moral damages; and
• The causal relation to the defendant’s act

XPN: Moral damages may be awarded to the victim in criminal proceedings without the need for allegation or proof of moral injury beyond the fact of death in murder or homicide.

NOTE: Moral damages are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. (Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014)

Award of moral damages to a corporation

GR: Juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network v. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol, G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005)

XPN: A corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages.

Moral damages recoverable under culpa contractual

GR: Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract.

XPNS: Moral damages may be awarded for a breach of contract when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In the carriage of passengers, they may also be awarded in the following instance:

• Where the passenger died by reason of negligence of the carrier (Art. 1764); or
• Where it is proved that the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if the death does not result. (Fores v. Miranda 105 Phil. 266; Pineda, 2010; Sulpicio Lines, Inc., v. Napoleon Sesante, G.R. No 172682, 27 July 2016)

NOTE: Even if the negligence of the bank is not attended with malice and bad faith, moral damages may be granted. (Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 131679, February 1, 2000)

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases (BAR AREA)

• A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
• Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
• Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
• Adultery or concubinage;
• Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
• Illegal search;
• Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
• Malicious prosecution;
• Acts mentioned in Article 309; and
• Actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 (NCC, Art. 2219).

NOTE: Art. 2219(1) and (2) of the NCC provide for criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries and quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, respectively.

Parents of the victim seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, may also recover moral damages. (NCC, Art. 2219) The prevailing jurisprudence is that the award of moral damages should be granted jointly to both the victim and her parents. Stated differently, the parents are not entitled to a separate award of moral damages. (People v. Delen, G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014)

NOTE: The term ‘physical injury,’ as used in Art. 2219(1) of the NCC, includes death, and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that such damages may be adjudicated. (People v. Tambis, G. R No. 124452, July 28, 1999)

Tortious acts referred to in chapter of human relations of the NCC

The plaintiff may recover moral damages:

• Willful acts contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
• Disrespect to the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of neighbors and other persons;
• Refusal or neglect of a public servant to perform his official duty without just cause;
• Unfair competition in enterprise or in labor;
• Civil action for damages against accused acquitted on reasonable doubt;
• Violation of civil rights;
• Refusal or failure of a member of a city or municipal police force to render aid or protection to a person in danger to life or property; and
• When the trial court finds no reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed after a preliminary investigation or when the prosecutor refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings.

Moral damages may be awarded, without proof of physical injury, for the acts and actions specified in Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code, including a violation of Article 21 established under the standards of Article 19; Article 19 alone is not an independent basis for damages. (Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. L-51832, April 26, 1989)

Cases where moral damages is mandatory without need of any proof

• Rape cases

NOTE: Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case without need of further proof other than the fact of its commission. For it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. (People v. Iroy, G.R. No. 187743, March 3, 2010)

• Murder cases

NOTE: Same rule applies in cases of frustrated murder.

• Homicide

In robbery and other common crimes, the grant of moral damages is not automatic, unlike in rape cases. (People v. Taño, G.R. No. 133872, May 5, 2000)

Civil indemnity different from moral damages in rape

In rape cases, civil indemnity is different from moral damages. It is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. (People v. Caldona, G.R. No. 126019, March 1, 2001)

NOTE: In criminal proceedings for rape, plaintiff need not prove the factual basis for moral damages as well as the causal relation to the defendant’s act.

Psychologically incapacity and moral damages

By declaring petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages was negated, which should have been proved by specific evidence that it was done deliberately. Thus, as the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. (Buenaventura v. CA, G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005)

Q: An article written by Raffy Tulfo, and was published in Abante Tonite, reported that a certain Michael C. Guy (Guy), who was being investigated for tax fraud, went to former Department of Finance Secretary Juanita Amatong (Secretary Amatong)'s house to ask for help. Claiming that the article had tainted his reputation, Guy filed a Complaint Affidavit against Tulfo and the following representatives of Abante Tonite's publisher. The RTC convicted Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. of the crime of libel and ordered them to pay Guy: (1) ₱5,000,000 as actual damages, and (2) ₱5,000,000 as moral damages. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, however, modified it – awarding exemplary damages in the amount of ₱500,000 and reduced moral damages to ₱500,000. Later on, in its Amended Decision, the CA deleted the exemplary damages, as well as the actual damages awarded by the RTC.

• Is Guy entitled to actual damages?
• Is Guy entitled to exemplary damages?
• Is the reduction of moral damages proper?

A:

• NO. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that actual damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. An award of actual damages is "dependent upon competent proof of the damages suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.
• YES. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' pronouncement, exemplary damages may be awarded even in the absence of aggravating circumstances. It may be awarded "where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender."
• YES. Article 2219 of the Civil Code specifically states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or defamation. The amount of moral damages that courts may award depends upon the set of circumstances for each case. There is no fixed standard to determine the amount of moral damages to be given. Courts are given the discretion to fix the amount to be awarded in favor of the injured party, so long as there is sufficient basis for awarding such amount. (Michael C. Guy V. Raffy Tulfo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., Janet Bay, Jesus P. Galang, Randy Hagos, Jeany Lacorte, And Venus Tandoc, G.R. No. 213023, April 10, 2019)