2. Standards of Judicial Review

TESTS TO DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OF A CLASSIFICATION

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.

Strict Scrutiny Test

The most demanding of all the three tests. Under the strict scrutiny test, the legislative classification is presumed to be unconstitutional and the government has the burden of proving that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. (Serrano v. Gallant, G.R. NO. 167614, Mar. 24, 2009)

The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. (Spark v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, Aug. 08, 2017)

Intermediate Scrutiny Test

The intermediate scrutiny test requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving the interest. (Serrano v. Gallant, G.R. No. 167614, Mar. 24, 2009)

The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. (Spark v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, Aug. 08, 2017)

Rational Basis Test

Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification is presumed valid and survives an equal protection challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; the challenger bears the burden of showing otherwise. (British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, Aug. 20 2009)

The rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. (Spark v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, Aug. 08, 2017)

New York Times Standard Not Applicable to Defamed Private Individuals

So long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability (less demanding than the New York Times standard – actual malice) for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.

The States, however, may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than the New York Times test may recover compensation only for actual injury. (Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, June 25, 1974)