F. Freedom of Religion

Accorded Preferred Status

Freedom of religion is accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. For conduct-based claims grounded in religious belief, the compelling-state-interest test determines whether accommodation is required: the State must establish a compelling interest and show that it pursued that interest through the least restrictive means. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. NO. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)

Limited Public Aid to Chaplaincies

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. (PHIL. CONST., art. VI, § 29[2])

Religious Instruction in Public Elementary and High Schools

At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government. (PHIL. CONST., art. XIV, § 3[3])

Concept

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10- 4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

The court determines whether an act is a religious ceremony and not any religious group or sect, or a follower of the said group or sect. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009)

Freedom to act on one's beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Abington Test

In U.S. jurisprudence, Abington examined a measure’s secular purpose and primary effect; the later Lemon test added excessive entanglement. The following three criteria describe the U.S. Lemon test, not the governing Philippine rule:

• The primary purpose of the law must be secular.
• The law must neither promote nor inhibit religion.
• There must be no excessive entanglement between church and state.

For Philippine free-exercise claims, apply the benevolent-neutrality framework and, for conduct-based claims grounded in religious belief, the compelling-state-interest test in Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006.

Under the U.S. test discussed in Abington, an enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution if either its purpose or its primary effect advances or inhibits religion. (School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, June 17, 1963)

No appropriation or use of public money for religious purposes

SECTION 29, ARTICLE VI. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium