Criminal Law › The Revised Penal Code – Book One › Criminal Liability › Participation in Acts Giving Rise to Criminal Liability
a. Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories
C. Persons Criminally Liable and Degree of Participation
- Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories – Articles 16-20
- Conspiracy and Proposal – Article 8
- As a mode of incurring criminal liability
- As a crime
- Liability for Multiple Commission of Crimes
- Recidivism – Article 14(9)
- Habituality – Article 14(10)
- Quasi-recidivism – Article 160
- Habitual delinquency –Article 62(5)
Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories
C. Persons Criminally Liable and Degree of Participation
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
c. Accessories
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals: (DIC)
PRINCIPALS
a. Those who take a Direct part in the execution of the act;
PRINCIPALS
b. Those who directly force or Induce others to commit it;
c. Those who Cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
The principal by direct participation personally takes part in the execution of the act constituting the crime. (Reyes, Book I)
REQUISITES:
2 or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct participation when:
- They participated in the criminal resolution; and
A person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. (People vs. Talla, G.R. No. 44414)
- They carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts, which directly tended to the same end.
A principal by direct participation must personally take part in executing the criminal plan to be carried out. Absence from the scene does not, by itself, exclude liability as a principal where conspiracy or another mode of principal participation is proved. (Reyes, Book I)
When this element is lacking, there is only conspiracy. (Id)
In conspiracy by prior agreement, the principal by direct participation who does not appear at the scene of the crime is not necessarily free from liability, because:
- Non-appearance alone does not establish desistance; effective withdrawal before the crime and participation in the conspiracy and its execution must be determined;
- Conspiracy is generally not a crime unless the law specifically provides a penalty and
- Criminal liability depends on proof of participation in the conspiracy and its execution
- Absence from the scene does not automatically limit liability to that of a principal by inducement. An absent person may still incur liability if the requisite conspiracy and participation are proved; liability as a principal by inducement requires direct, determining inducement. (Revised Penal Code, Arts. 8 and 17)
Private individual offender who conspires with public officers
However, private individuals who conspire with public officers can be liable as principals in the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
Participation and Liability
- Principals – All who participated as principals in the robbery are principals in robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears they endeavored to prevent the same. (People v. Carrozo, 342 SCRA 600; People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 139697)
- Accessory – necessity of knowledge
- There is an issue regarding the penalty imposable against an accessory without knowledge of the killing committed during robbery. Jurisprudence [People v. Doble, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Adriano y Sanguesa, 95 SCRA 107] provides that such an accessory could not have prevented the same, hence, should be an accessory only to the crime of simple robbery; Art. 53 of the RPC provides that the penalty for an accessory is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Since robbery cannot be disaggregated from the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, there is an issue on the basis of such an accessory’s penalty.
Effects of acquittal of principal by direct participation upon the liability of principal by inducement:
- Acquittal of a co-accused does not necessarily negate conspiracy; its effect depends on the ground for acquittal and the evidence against the remaining accused.
- One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another. (People vs. Ong Chiat, G.R. No. L-39086)
- But if the one charged as principal by direct participation is acquitted, it does not necessarily lead to the acquittal of the principal by inducement. (People vs. Po Giok To, G.R. No. L-7236)
Adherence without Physical Manifestations
Mere adherence without its physical manifestation through the giving of aid or comfort to the enemy does not suffice. They must concur. (People v Tan, PC, 42 O.G. 1263)
(iii) PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
REQUISITES:
- Participation in the criminal resolution means an anterior conspiracy or a unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged. The stated requirements are participation in that resolution, conspiracy, sufficient concurrence, and indispensable cooperation.
- A principal by indispensable cooperation performs another act without which the offense would not have been accomplished. The cooperation must be indispensable. If the accused’s participation is dispensable, the accused is only an accomplice, not a principal. If the cooperation is necessary to execute the offense, the accused is a principal under Article 17(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
- By contrast, a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1) takes a direct part in executing the criminal act.
Cooperation
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case. (People v. Aplegido, G.R. No. L-163)
There can be no principal by inducement or principal by cooperation unless there is a principal by direct participation. However, there may be a principal by direct participation despite the absence of the former.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
In the absence of conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for acts committed by him. (U.S. v. Magcomot, G.R. No. L- 18289)
Persons liable:
- Person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries, if identifiable; or
- If it is not known who inflicted serious physical injuries on the deceased, all persons who used violence upon the person of the victim
Collective Criminal Responsibility
There is collective criminal responsibility when the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. Participants may be liable for the same offense, but each offender’s penalty must be determined after applying any mitigating or aggravating circumstances personal to that offender (Revised Penal Code, Art. 62(3)).
| BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION | BY INDUCEMENT | BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION |
| WHO ARE DEEMED PRINCIPALS | ||
| Takes part in the execution of the act constituting the crime; | 1. Directly forcing another to commit a crime by: ◦ using irresistible force; ◦ causing uncontrollable fear. 2. Directly inducing another to commit a crime by: ◦ giving price, or offering reward or promise; ◦ using words of command |
Cooperates in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would not have been accomplished; and |
| COLLECTIVE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY | ||
| Absent conspiracy or another basis for collective liability, each principal by direct participation is liable only for the acts attributable to that principal (Revised Penal Code, Arts. 8 and 17). | Principal by inducement (except those who directly forced another to commit a crime) and principal by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. In case of Inducement by forcing another to commit a crime, either through: (a) irresistible force or (b) uncontrollable fear – the inducer is liable as the principal, while the material executor is not liable due to Art. 12 pars. 5 and 6 In case of inducing another to commit a crime by either: (a) giving price or offering reward or promise or (b) through the use of words of command – there is collective criminal responsibility. |
Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective criminal responsibility with the principal by direct participation |
ACCOMPLICES
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
Notes:
- If robbery and assault were committed by a band, even if the members conspired to commit robbery only, liability for the assault requires a basis in the proved conspiracy, participation, or an applicable provision of Article 296 (Revised Penal Code, Arts. 8, 17, and 296); consider also whether:
- The accused prevented or attempted to prevent the assault (Revised Penal Code, Art. 296); or
- The accused is a principal by inducement only as to the commission of robbery, unless he eventually ordered the assault (or the commission of other crimes, for that matter)
- A band exists when more than three armed malefactors take part in committing the robbery (Revised Penal Code, Art. 296). Each accused’s participation must be established; conspiracy cannot be presumed solely from the number of armed offenders (Revised Penal Code, Art. 8).
- If rape was committed by one member of the band without the knowledge of the others, he alone is guilty of Robbery with Rape.
Art 297. Attempted and Frustrated Robbery Committed Under Certain Circumstances
Punishable Acts:
- Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not; and
- Lending assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of doing the killing himself
REQUISITES:
- There is community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal, he concurs with the latter in his purpose.
Knowledge of the criminal design of the principal can be acquired by the accomplice when:
- The principal informs or tells the accomplice of the former’s criminal design; and
- The accomplice saw the criminal acts of the principal;
The community of design need not be to commit the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime actually committed was a natural or probable consequence of the intended crime. (Reyes, Book I)
- He cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
The accomplice knowingly cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, without taking a direct part in its commission as a principal. But the cooperation of an accomplice is only necessary, not indispensable. (Reyes, Book I)
However, if there is conspiracy between two or among several persons, even if the cooperation of one offender is only necessary, the latter is also a principal by conspiracy. The nature of the cooperation becomes immaterial. (Id)
The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes against persons should not have caused the death of victim. The person charged as an accomplice should not have inflicted a mortal wound. (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571) If he inflicted a mortal wound, he becomes a principal by direct participation.
Absent knowledge of the criminal purpose of the principal, giving aid or encouragement, either morally or materially, in the commission of the crime, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not make one an accomplice. (People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-28548)
- There should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
Accomplice vs. Principal in General
| ACCOMPLICE | PRINCIPAL |
| PARTICIPATION | |
| Does not take direct part in the commission of the act; does not force or induce others to commit it; or does not cooperate in the commission of the crime by another act, without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous means | Either takes direct part in the commission of the act; induces, or forces another to commit it; or cooperates in the commission of the crime by another act, without which it would not have been accomplished |
| KNOWLEDGE | |
| Has knowledge of the criminal design of the principal and merely concurs with the criminal purpose | Has knowledge of the criminal design and carries/executes it |
Accomplice vs. Principal By Indispensable Cooperation
| ACCOMPLICE | PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION |
| NECESSITY OF PARTICIPATION | |
| Participation is not indispensable | Participation is indispensable |
| DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION | |
| Cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way | Knowingly cooperates in the commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished; an anterior conspiracy need not be shown (Revised Penal Code, Art. 17(3)) |
Accomplice vs. Principal By Direct Participation
| ACCOMPLICE | PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION |
| Community of criminal designHowever such community need not be to commit the crime actually committed; it is sufficient that there was a common purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime actually committed was a natural or probable consequence of the intended crime | Community of criminal design |
| No clear cut distinction between the acts of the accomplice and those of the principal by direct participation. That is why, in case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of lesser responsibility, that is, that of mere accomplice; | |
| Several persons may be liable as principals for the same offense without conspiracy, if each directly participates in its commission. Conspiracy, when proved, may make each conspirator liable for acts done in furtherance of their common design (Revised Penal Code, Arts. 8 and 17) | Between principals and accomplices, there is no conspiracy |
Accomplice vs. Conspirator
| ACCOMPLICE | CONSPIRATOR |
| Both know the criminal design. An accomplice concurs in the purpose without joining the agreement to commit the felony. | A conspirator joins the agreement and decision to commit the felony. |
| An accomplice knowingly cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts without joining the agreement to commit the crime | A person who joins the agreement to commit the crime may be a conspirator, even if others first devised the plan |
| They are merely instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense | They are the authors of a crime |
ACCESSORY
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
PRINCIPALS
ACCESSORIES
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Knowledge of the commission of the crime
An accessory must have knowledge of the commission of the crime, and having that knowledge, he took part subsequent to its commission. In the absence of positive proof, direct or circumstantial, of his knowledge that the goods were of illegal origin or fraudulently acquired by the vendors at the time of the transaction, a customer who purchases such goods cannot be held criminally responsible as accessory. (People vs. Labrador, C.A., 36 O.G. 166)
How accessory takes part
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in 3 ways:
- By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime (Par. 1)
- Profiting themselves by the effects of the crime
A person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the same had been stolen, is guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463, 467)
The accessory should not take the property without the consent of the principal. Otherwise, he is not an accessory but a principal in the crime of theft.
- Assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime
A person who receives any property from another, which he knows to have been stolen, and sells the same for the thief to whom he gives the proceeds of the sale, is guilty of the crime of theft, as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Galanco, 11 Phil. 575)
An accessory should not be in conspiracy with the principal
- By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery (Par. 2)
The body of the crime is the corpus delicti. It means that someone in fact committed a specific offense.
The accessory must conceal or destroy the body of the crime, or its effects or instruments, to prevent discovery. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 19(2))
- By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime (Par. 3)
Classes of accessories in par. 3:
- Public officers, who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions
Requisites:
- The accessory is a public officer;
- He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal;
- He acts with abuse of his public function; and
- The crime committed by the principals is any crime, except a light felony; and
- Private persons, who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime – guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Requisites:
- The accessory is a private person;
- He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime;
- The crime committed by the principal is either:
- Treason;
- Parricide;
- Murder;
- An attempt against the life of the president; or
- That the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
| PUBLIC OFFICERS | PRIVATE PERSONS |
| Harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal of any crime | Harbors, conceals or assisting the escape of the author of the crime |
| Accessory is a public officer | Accessory is a private person |
| Public officer acts with abuse of his public functions | No abuse required (not a public officer) |
| Crime committed by the principal involves any crime, except light felonies | Crime committed by the principal is either: • treason, • parricide, • murder, • an attempt against the life of the President, or • that the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. |
Persons Liable; Their Acts and Penalty
| PARTICIPANT | ACTS |
| REBELLION OR INSURRECTION | |
| Leaders | Promotes, maintains, heads |
| Participants | Participates or executes the commands of others |
| COUP D’ETAT | |
| Leaders | Leads, directs, or commands others to undertake a coup d'etat |
| Participants in government service | Participates or executes the commands of others |
| Participants not in government service | Aids, abets, finances, or otherwise assists commission |
When conviction of accessory is possible, even if principal is acquitted
Conviction of an accessory is possible notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal, if the crime was in fact committed, but the principal was not held criminally liable, because of an exempting circumstance (Art. 12), such as insanity or minority. In exempting circumstances, there is a crime committed. Hence, there is a basis for convicting the accessory. (Reyes, Book I)
Even if the principal is still unknown or at large, the accessory may be held responsible provided the requisites prescribed by law for the existence of the crime are present and that someone committed it. (Id)
Where the commission of the crime and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory, are established, the accessory can be convicted, notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal. (Vino vs. People, G.R. No. 84163)
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY<br>
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
The accessory Is EXEMPT from criminal liability, when the principal is his:
- Spouse;
- Ascendant;
- Descendant; or
- Legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister, or Relative by affinity within the same degree.
The accessory is NOT EXEMPT from criminal liability even if the principal is related to him, if such accessory:
- Profited by the effects of the crime;
- Assisted the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; and
This is because such acts are prompted not by affection but by a detestable greed. (Reyes, Book I)
Only accessories under Art. 19 (2) and (3) are exempt from criminal liability if they are related to the principals. (Id)
CONSPIRACY
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
Conspiracy and proposal to commit a crime are only preparatory acts, and the law regards them as innocent or at least permissible except in rare and exceptional cases.
Assistant to a principal
Being a mere assistant to a principal (leader) who is guilty of rebellion, the accused is guilty only as a participant in the commission of rebellion under par. 2, Art 135. (People v Lava, GR No. L-4974-78)
Persons liable:
- Principals – person who killed, or inflicted physical injuries upon, his adversary, or both combatants, in any other cases
- Accomplices – seconds (person who make the selection of the arms and fix the other conditions of the fight)
Notes:
- A duel is a formal or regular combat previously concerted between two parties in the presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight.
- Intent to kill is disregarded where only physical injuries result. Penalty will be that for physical injuries only, as opposed to those imposed for frustrated/attempted homicide. (2nd paragraph of the provision)
Art. 261. Challenging to a Duel
Circumstances which make private individuals liable
- When they are in conspiracy with public officers;
- When they have charge of national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property in any capacity;
- Those who are accessories or accomplices of an erring public officer; and
- Depositories or administrators of public funds or property
Notes:
- When malversation is not committed through negligence, lack of criminal intent or good faith is a defense.
- The failure of a public officer to have any dulyforthcoming public funds or property upon demand, by any authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
- Returning embezzled funds is not an exempting circumstance but only mitigating. However, the return of the malversed funds should be “prompt.”
- A person whose negligence made possible the commission of malversation by another can be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
- Malversation may be commited either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence, by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. (People v Jose Ting Lan Uy, GR No. 157399)
- The fact that the obligation to deposit the collections of the City Treasurer's Office is not covered by appellant's official job description is of no legal consequence in a prosecution for Malversation. What is essential is that appellant had custody or control of public funds by reason of the duties of his office. (People v. Hipol, 454 Phil. 679)
- See Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 116033, Feb. 26, 1997], where the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over a private individual who accepted custody of distrained property. The Court said, “It is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as a depositary of the garnished dumptruck.”
Persons liable:
- Challengers, and
- Instigators
There must be intention to have a formal duel (as opposed to light threats under Art. 285, par. 2)
Unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime is shown in the following cases:
- Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint responsibility.
- Active cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of the crime will also create joint responsibility.
- Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common criminal intent also creates joint responsibility.
- Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and lending moral support thereto, also create joint responsibility with the material executors.
- Where one of the accused knew of the plan of the others to kill the two victims and he accepted the role assigned to him, which was to shoot one of the victims, and he actually performed that role, he is a co-principal by direct participation in the double murder. (Reyes, Book I)
Spontaneous Agreement
- Active cooperation by all offenders;
- Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common criminal intent; and
- Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and lending moral support thereto.
Other instance when accomplice is punished as principal:
Anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of slight illegal detention shall receive the same penalty for the crime. (REYES, BOOK TWO, p.998, Art. 268 par. 2)
Accomplice and accessories
Habitual delinquency applies to accomplices and accessories of habitual delinquency crimes. (People vs. San Juan, G.R. No. L–46896)
Accomplice
Any person who knowingly aids or protects pirates or abets the commission of piracy shall be considered as an accomplice.
Revised Penal Code, Art. 122, as amended by R.A. No. 7659
Liability:
- Person delivering detainee from jail may be held liable as an accessory if the person helped has committed treason, murder, or parricide, because the person delivering assists in the escape of the principal.
- A prisoner who voluntarily leaves a jail/penal establishment cannot be held liable under this article.
- If he is a prisoner by final judgement, he may be liable under Art. 157.
- If he is merely a detention prisoner, he is not liable since he has no sentence to be evaded.
-
Must all be principals by direct participation
The armed persons contemplated must all be principals by direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime; conspiracy is not presumed merely from their acting as a band and must be proved by their acts and circumstances. (People v. Lozano, G.R. No.s 1317370-71)
b. Persons who insure or afford impunity. (PAR. 8)
REQUISITES:
- That armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly; and
- That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed.
"With the aid of armed men" (Par. 8), distinguished from "by a band." (Par. 6)
Aid of armed men is present even if one of the offenders merely relied on their aid, for actual aid is not necessary. If there are 4 armed men, aid of armed men is absorbed in employment of a band. If there are 3 armed men or less, aid of armed men may be the aggravating circumstance. (Reyes, Book I)
It shall not be considered when both the attacking party and the party attacked were equally armed.
In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise, they are to be regarded as coprincipals or co-conspirators. (People v. Enoja, G.R No. 204894)
| BY A BAND (PAR. 6) | WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN (PAR. 8) |
| As to NUMBER | |
| Requires more than 3 armed malefactors | At least 2 |
| As to ACTION | |
| More than 3 armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense | Present even if 1 of the offenders merely relied on their aid; actual aid is not necessary |
| As to LIABILITY | |
| Band members are all principals | Armed men are mere accomplices |
11. THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD OR PROMISE (PAR. 11)
REQUISITES:
- There are at least 2 principals:
- Principal by inducement (one who offers); and
- Principal by direct participation (one who accepts);
- The price, reward, or promise should be previous to and in consideration of the commission of the criminal act.
Price, reward or promise must be for the purpose of inducing another to perform the deed
If without previous promise it was given voluntarily after the crime had been committed as an expression of his appreciation for the sympathy and aid shown by the other accused, it should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the penalty. (U.S v. Flores, G.R No. 9008)
The evidence must show that one of the accused used money or other valuable consideration for the purpose of inducing another to perform the deed. (U.S v. Gamao, G.R. No. 6942)
Entrapment v. Instigation
| ENTRAPMENT | INSTIGATION |
| The ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan; | In instigation, the instigator induces a person to commit an offense that the person would not otherwise have committed; unlike entrapment, this bars the instigated person's conviction; |
| NOT a bar to accused’s prosecution and conviction; and | Accused will be acquitted; and |
| NOT an absolutory cause. | Absolutory cause |
Authorities
- , Sec. 157
- Amparo v. People, G.R. No. 204990, 22 February 2017
- Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, 26 February 1997
- De Filipinas v. Aplegido, G.R. No. L-163, 27 April 1946
- De Filipinas v. San Juan, G.R. No. 46896, 15 January 1940
- Id
- Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act / applicable penal provisions, Sec. 62
- People v. Adriano y Sanguesa
- People v. Carrozo
- People v. Doble, G.R. No. L-30028, 14 June 1966
- People v. Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, 17 November 2014
- People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 139697, 15 June 2004
- People v. Hipol, G.R. No. 140549, 22 July 2003
- People v. Jose Ting Lan Uy, G.R. No. 157399
- People v. Labrador
- People v. Lava, G.R. No. L-4974, 16 May 1969
- People v. Lozano, G.R. No. s 1317370-71
- People v. Ong Chiat, G.R. No. L-39086
- People v. Talla, G.R. No. L-44414, 18 January 1990
- People v. Tan
- People v. Tanchoco, G.R. No. L-38, 6 April 1946
- People v. To, G.R. No. L-7236, 30 April 1955
- People v. Toling, G.R. No. L-28548
- Revised Penal Code
- Revised Penal Code (cited in REYES, Book Two, p.998), Sec. 2
- Revised Penal Code, Art. 14
- Revised Penal Code, Art. 16
- Revised Penal Code, Art. 160
- Revised Penal Code, Art. 8
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 12
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 135
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 17
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 18
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 19
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 20
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 261
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 296
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 297
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 62
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 8
- Revised Penal Code|R.A. No. 7659, Sec. 122
- Reyes, Book I
- RPC, Sec. 53
- U.s v. Flores, G.R. No. 9008
- U.s. v. Magcomot, G.R. No. L-18289
- United States v. Galanco, G.R. No. L-4440, 5 November 1908
- United States v. Gamao, G.R. No. L-6942, 30 August 1912
- Vino v. People, G.R. No. 84163, 19 October 1989