Civil Law and Land Titles and Deeds › Family Relations (EO 209, as amended) › Family Relations

6. Parental Authority

10. Parental Authority

a. Concept of Parental Authority b. Substitute Parental Authority c. Special Parental Authority d. Effects of Parental Authority

P. Parental Authority (Family Code, arts. 209-233)

Parental Authority (Family Code, arts. 209-233)

TITLE IX

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)

Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)

Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority

Upon the Persons of the Children

Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires. (317)

Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.

However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.

The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority

Upon the Property of the Children

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds ₱500,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.

The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)

Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus given in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)

Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;

(2) Upon the death of the child; or

(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:

(1) Upon adoption of the child;

(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;

(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;

(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or

(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)

Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose or in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:

(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;

(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;

(3) Compels the child to beg; or

(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.

If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.

The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)

Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Exclude: A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC; A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC; R.A. No. 8972, as amended; R.A. No. 8980; R.A. No. 9231

Parental Authority is “the mass of rights and obligations which parents have in relation to the person and property of their children until their emancipation and even after this under certain circumstances.” (Sempio- Diy, 1995)

Updated: A child under seven must not be separated from the mother absent compelling reasons, regardless of legitimacy (Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018).

Parental authority includes

  • Caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency;
  • Development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (FC, Art. 209)

Other obligations of spouses

  • Exercise the duties and enjoy the rights of parents;
  • Answer, subject to the conditions and defenses provided by law, for civil liability arising from injuries caused by their unemancipated children living in their company;
  • Exercise parental authority over children’s property

Characteristics of parental authority

  • Jointly exercised by the father and mother;
  • Natural right and duty of the parents; GR: Cannot be renounced, transferred or waived. XPN: In cases authorized by law such as in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. (Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995).
  • Purely personal;
  • Temporary.

Updated: A mother has sole parental authority over her illegitimate child, and custody determinations must consider the child's best interests (Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018).

Exercise of parental authority

The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. (FC, Art. 211)

If the child is illegitimate, parental authority is with the mother. (FC, Art. 176)

NOTE: Establishing paternity or living together does not, by itself, confer joint parental authority over an illegitimate child. The mother exercises parental authority even if the father is known and the parents cohabit. (FC, Art. 176)

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. Relinquishment in connection with domestic adoption is governed by RA 11642. (FC, Art. 210; RA 11642)

Visitation rights

It is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.

Updated: A noncustodial parent's access may be subject to limits on visitation and taking the child out when the child's best interests require them (Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018).

Who are entitled of visitation rights

  • The non-custodial parent in cases of:

Legal separation;

  • Separation de facto;
  • Annulment;
  • Declaration of nullity of marriage, including on the ground of psychological incapacity. Under Article 53, failure to comply with Article 52 renders a subsequent marriage void;
  • Illegitimate father over his illegitimate child.

NOTE: During the pendency of an action, Article 49 of the Family Code directs the court, in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, to provide appropriate visitation rights for the parent who does not have custody, giving paramount consideration to the children's moral and material welfare. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, a person has no legally demandable right of visitation. (Concepcion v. CA, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005)

Q: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship. They had two children, namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Gonzales eventually separated. They had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. Silva claimed that Gonzales broke that understanding on visitation rights. Hence, Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the RTC. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in gambling and womanizing which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Can Silva be denied visitation rights?

A: GR: NO.

XPN: If the fears and apprehensions were founded as to the father’s corrupting influence over the children and if it is proven therefore that indeed the father is a negative influence because of reasons like immorality, drunkenness, etc. on the children, the court, taking into consideration the best interest of the children, can deny his petition for the exercise of his visitation rights. (Silva v. CA, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997)

Parental Preference Rule

The natural parents, who are of good character and who can reasonably provide for the child, are ordinarily entitled to custody as against all persons.

NOTE: Tender-Age Presumption:

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise [FC, Art 213(2)].

The paramount consideration in matters of custody of a child is the welfare and well-being of the child.

The use of the word “shall” in Art. 213 of the FC is mandatory in character. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below 7 years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. (Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. No. L-23482, August 30, 1968)

“Compelling Reasons”

The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:

  • Insanity
  • Abandonment
  • Neglect
  • Drug addiction
  • Afflicted with a communicable disease
  • Maltreatment of the child
  • Immorality
  • Unemployment
  • Habitual drunkenness

NOTE: In one case, the SC ruled that sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence; to deprive the wife of custody of her minor child, her moral lapses must have an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or it must have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005).

Exercise of parental authority in case of absence, death, remarriage of either parent, or legal or de facto separation of parents

  • Absence or death of either parent – parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
  • Remarriage of the surviving parent – it shall not affect parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person as guardian of their person or property. (Family Code, Art. 212) NOTE: Parental authority is not automatically given to the new spouse over the child of the surviving parent, unless such new spouse legally adopts the children.
  • Legal or de facto separation of parents – the parent designated by the court.

Considerations in the designation of child custody

The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations in the designation of the parent, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age except when the parent chosen is unfit. (FC, Art. 213)

Q: Herald, an American citizen, and Sharon, Filipino, got married in Manila in 1994. Their union was blessed with one daughter, Stephanie who was born in 1995. In 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree against Herald from Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved the parties’ marriage and awarded to Sharon the sole custody of Stephanie. In 2002, Herald and Sharon executed in Manila a contract for the joint custody of Stephanie. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon alleging that she violated their contract as she retained sole custody over Stephanie. The RTC dismissed Herald’s complaint and ruled that the parties’ contract is void for contravening Article 2035 (5) of the Civil Code. Is the RTC correct?

A: NO, not as a final disposition of custody. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, a child under seven shall not be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Stephanie was older than seven when the custody dispute was litigated. The court must consider all relevant circumstances and determine the custodial arrangement that serves her best interest. The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s orders and remanded the case to allow the parties to present evidence on that arrangement. (Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010)

Q: If the parents are separated de facto, who between them has custody over their child/ children?

A: In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both of them have custody over their child/children.

The parent who has been deprived of the rightful custody of the child may resort to the remedy of habeas corpus. (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006)

NOTE: The general rule that children less than 7 years of age shall not be separated from the mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care. This is predicated on the "best interest of the child" principle which pervades not only child custody cases but also those involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status and minors in conflict with the law. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994/G.R. No. 156254, June 28, 2005)

This also avoids the tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. (Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010)

Q: Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James. Ricky James alleged that, the parents of Renalyn took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody before the RTC (petition a quo). Upon reaching the CA it remanded the case a quo for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie. Was such action proper?

A: NO, CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.

General rule is that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. (Masbate vs. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018)

Substitute Parental Authority

It is the parental authority which the persons designated by law may exercise over the persons and property of unemancipated children in case of death, absence or unsuitability of both parents, or in default of a judicially appointed guardian.

Order of substitute parental authority

  • Surviving Grandparent; NOTE: The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority. (Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995)
  • Oldest brother or sister, over 21 years unless unfit or disqualified;
  • Actual Custodian over 21 years unless unfit or disqualified (FC, Art. 216);
  • In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (FC, Art. 217)

Effect of the recognition of an illegitimate child by the Father

Such recognition would be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not the custody of the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. (Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004)

Also, under the R.A. 9255, the illegitimate child has the option to use the surname of the father.

NOTES:

Foundling – a child with unknown parentage whose birth circumstances cannot be determined, as covered by the Foundling Recognition and Protection Act (RA 11767, Sec. 3).

Abandoned – a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship.

Neglected – a child whose basic needs have been deliberately or inadequately unattended.

Q: Bonifacia Vancil, a US citizen, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in the USA on December 22, 1986.

During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil, Jr. She alleged that Helen was morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that Helen’s live-in partner raped Valerie several times.

Can Bonifacia exercise substitute parental authority over Valerie and Vincent?

A: NO. Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability.

Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live- in partner raped Valerie several times. (But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding).

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, Bonifacia admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. (Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001)

Special Parental Authority

It is the parental authority granted by law to certain persons, entities or institutions in view of their special relation to children under their supervision instruction or custody. It is denominated as special because it is limited and is present only when the child is under their supervision instruction or custody. It can also co- exist with the parents’ parental authority.

Persons who may exercise special parental authority (FC, Art. 218)

  • The school;
  • School administrators;
  • School teachers;
  • Individual, entity or institution engaged in childcare.

Scope of special parental authority

The scope of special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

NOTE: The nature of the liability of persons having special parental authority over said minors for their acts or omissions causing damage to another is principal and solidary. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. (FC, Art. 219)

Substitute parental authority vis-à-vis Special parental authority

Substitute Parental Authority Special Parental Authority
Exercised in case of: (DAU)Death, Absence or Unsuitability of Parents Exercised concurrently with the parental authority of the parents. While the child is under the school's supervision, instruction, or custody, the school exercises special parental authority for authorized activities; the parents do not thereby relinquish their parental authority.

Effects of Parental Authority

Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Child:

  • The father and mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the minor common child without court appointment.
  • In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary
  • If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent is required to furnish a bond of not less than 10% of the value of the child’s property or income
  • The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively for support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise NOTE: The fruits and income of the child’s property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family

The parent’s authority over the estate of the ward as a legal guardian would not extend to acts of encumbrance or disposition, as distinguished from acts of management or administration (Nario v. Philippine American Life Ins. Co., G.R. No. L22796). Owner check: Verify the G.R. number in this citation; the supplied case source lists G.R. No. L-22796.

A parent has no power to compromise their children’s claims, for a compromise has always been deemed equivalent to an alienation, and is an act of strict ownership that goes beyond mere administration (Visaya, et al. v. Suiguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300).

Q: Jayson and his classmates were conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Tabugo, the subject teacher and employee of St. Joseph College. Tabugo left her class while the experiment was ongoing without having adequately secured the students from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass and it was moved towards his eyes. At that instance, the compound spurted from the test tube and several particles hit Jayson’s eyes. His left eye was chemically burned, for which he had to undergo surgery and spend for medication. Jayson filed a complaint for damages against the school and Tabugo. Can the said school and its teacher, Tabugo, be held liable for the unfortunate incident of Jayson?

A: YES. The proximate cause of the student’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. Art. 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on a school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care, and these persons have responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

In this case, the petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution was demonstrated by the following: (i) petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class; (ii) petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments in class; (iii) petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and (iv) petitioner Tabugo (the teacher) was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving the student occurred. (St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY: PARENTS

Basis of vicarious liability of the parents; “Principle of Parental Liability” (BAR AREA)

This liability is made natural as a logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents exercising parental authority which includes controlling, disciplining, and instructing their children. In this jurisdiction, the parent’s liability is vested by law which assumes that when a minor or unemancipated child living with their parent, commits a tortious act, the parents are presumed negligent in the performance of their duty to supervise the children under their custody. (Tamargo v. CA, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992)

Vicarious liability of other persons exercising parental authority

In default of the parents or a judicially appointed guardian, parental authority shall be exercised by the following persons in the order indicated:

  • Surviving grandparents;
  • Oldest sibling, over 21 years old, unless unfit or unqualified; or
  • Child’s actual custodian, over 21 years old, unless unfit or disqualified. (FC, Art. 216)

Special Parental Authority under the Family Code

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

Defenses available

For liability under Article 219 of the Family Code, those exercising special parental authority, and the persons subsidiarily liable, are not liable if they prove that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. As for the employer, if he shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision of his employees he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. (Layugan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980)

Q: A 15-year-old high school student stabs his classmate who is his rival for a girl, while they were going out of the classroom after their last class. Who may be held liable?

A: Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity, or institution. If the student remained under the school's supervision or custody, the school, its administrators and teachers exercising special parental authority may be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by his act. His parents, judicial guardian, or persons exercising substitute parental authority may be subsidiarily liable, subject to the diligence defense in Article 219 of the Family Code.

Authorities

  • Act No. 3094
  • Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, 20 March 2006
  • Civil Code, Art. 218
  • Civil Code, Art. 2180
  • Civil Code, Art. 219
  • Civil Code, Sec. 2035
  • Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, 2 October 2006
  • Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, 5 February 2010
  • Family Code, Art. 209
  • Family Code, Art. 213
  • Family Code, Sec. 176
  • Family Code, Sec. 209
  • Family Code, Sec. 210
  • Family Code, Sec. 211
  • Family Code, Sec. 212
  • Family Code, Sec. 213
  • Family Code, Sec. 214
  • Family Code, Sec. 215
  • Family Code, Sec. 216
  • Family Code, Sec. 217
  • Family Code, Sec. 218
  • Family Code, Sec. 219
  • Family Code, Sec. 220
  • Family Code, Sec. 221
  • Family Code, Sec. 222
  • Family Code, Sec. 49
  • Family Code, Sec. 52
  • Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson, G.R. No. L-23482, 30 August 1968
  • Layugan v. Iac, G.R. No. L-49542
  • Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018
  • Nario v. Philippine American Life Insurance Company, G.R. No. L-22796, 26 June 1967
  • New Civil Code, Sec. 2180
  • Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005
  • R.A. 9255
  • Rules of Court, Sec. 99
  • Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. No. 162734, 29 August 2006
  • Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, 16 March 1995
  • Silva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114742, 17 July 1997
  • St. Joseph's College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, 29 June 2010
  • Sta. Maria
  • Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85044, 3 June 1992
  • Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, 19 June 2001
  • Visaya v. Suiguitan, G.R. No. L-8300