B. Ignorance of the Law

B. Ignorance of the Law; (Civil Code, art. 3) Ignorance of Fact

> Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

Presumption of knowledge of laws

GR: Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. Hence, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (NCC, Art. 3)

This conclusive presumption presupposes that the law has been published. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis non excusat. (Rabuya, 2009)

Situations in which a mistake about a doubtful or difficult question of law may have legal effect:

• For possession, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. [NCC, Art. 526 (3)]
• For mistaken payment, payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come within the scope of the preceding article. (NCC, Art. 2155)

NOTE: The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful  or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016)

Mistake of fact vs. Mistake of law

Q: Eduardo was married to Ruby. He then met Tina and proposed marriage, assuring her that he was single. They got married and lived together. Tina, upon learning that Eduardo had been previously married, charged Eduardo for bigamy for which he was convicted. Eduardo testified that he declared he was “single” because he believed in good faith that his first wife was already dead, having not heard from her for 20 years, and that he did not know that he had to obtain a judicial declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death before marrying Tina. Is Eduardo liable for the crime of bigamy?

A: YES. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina. Mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Eduardo has the burden to prove that when he married Tina, he has a well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Art. 349 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 41 of the FC. Eduardo needed to obtain a judicial declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death before marrying Tina; his claimed good-faith belief alone did not satisfy that requirement. (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005)

Q: Complainants who were connected with the Daily Informer (a widely circulated newspaper in Western Visayas) were charged before the MTC by Judge Pamonag of the crime of libel. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued warrants for the arrest of the complainants. Complainants filed an administrative case against the judge for gross ignorance of the law. They contended that the judge neither has authority to conduct a preliminary investigation nor to issue warrants for their arrest. The judge said that it was his first libel case and that he issued the warrants in good faith. Is the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

A: YES. Judges are expected more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply them properly in good faith. The applicable rules governing preliminary investigation, together with Art. 360 of the RPC on libel actions, should have been observed. Not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Miaque v. Judge Pamonag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1412, March 28, 2003)

Q: Cheong Boo, a native of China died intestate in Zamboanga. He left a property worth P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed on one hand by Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Boo in 1896. Gee introduced in evidence a document in Chinese stating the marriage ceremony that took place in Amoy, China. Is the document presented by Gee sufficient enough to prove the Chinese marriage of Cheong Boo and Tan Dit?

A: NO. The Supreme Court held that the document is not sufficient to prove the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit. Gee only presented a document in Chinese stating the alleged marriage ceremony but there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. Therefore, there is lacking proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

Ignorance of a foreign law is not ignorance of the law but of fact because such foreign law must be first alleged and proved as a matter of fact, there being no judicial notice of said foreign law. Thus, the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. (Estate of Boo v. Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922)