Political and Public International Law › Constitutional Rights
Q. Right Against Excessive Fines, Cruel and Inhuman Punishment
T. Right Against Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments
1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 19
> art. III, sec. 19
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. (PHIL. CONST., art. III, § 19)
“Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,” as prohibited by Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution, is distinct from a “clearly excessive” penalty under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel, degrading or inhuman. Thus, to be “cruel, degrading or inhuman” or “excessive” within the meaning of the constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed; but to be “clearly excessive” under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, it need only be disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender.
It has been held that to come under the constitutional ban on excessive and inhuman punishment, the punishment must be ‘flagrantly and plainly oppressive,’ ‘wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, Aug. 27, 1953)
Cruel and Inhuman
Involves torture or lingering suffering (e.g., being drawn and quartered).
Excessive Fine
When under any circumstance, the fine is disproportionate to the offense.
Guides for Determining Whether a Punishment is “Cruel and Unusual”
- It must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
- It must not be applied arbitrarily.
- It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
- It must not be excessive.
Note
It must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment would. (Brennan concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 1972)
R.A. 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)
Anti-Hazing Law
The Anti Hazing Law does not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The prohibition contemplates "extreme corporeal or psychological punishment.“ Penalties like fines or imprisonment may be cruel, degrading, or inhuman only when they are "flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." A penalty’s legitimate purpose is relevant, but its severity must also be assessed against the nature of the offense. The Anti-Hazing Law seeks to punish the conspiracy of silence and secrecy, tantamount to impunity, that would otherwise shroud the crimes committed. Hence, the penalty has a legitimate purpose and is not flagrantly and plainly oppressive or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense, and the constitutional prohibition is not violated. (Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162)
DEATH PENALTY
Death penalty was abolished because:
- It inflicts traumatic pain not just on the convict but also on his family, even if the penalty is not carried out.
- There was no convincing evidence that it is effective as a deterrent of serious crime.
- Penology favors reformative rather than vindictive penalties.
- Life is too precious a gift to be placed at the discretion of a human judge.
- The law itself, by imposing so many safeguards before such is carried out, manifests a reluctance to impose it. (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)
Legislature may re-impose it, subject to the following conditions:
- That Congress defines what is meant by heinous crimes;
- That Congress specify and penalize by death, only those crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition set in heinous crimes law or death penalty law; and
- That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill, be singularly motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.” (People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, Feb. 7, 1997)
Authorities
- 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 19
- Anti-Hazing Law
- Fuertes v. Senate of Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, 7 January 2020
- Furman v. Georgia, G.R. No. 408 U.S. 238
- People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997
- People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, 27 August 1953
- R.A. 9346
- Revised Penal Code, Sec. 5