a. Calling Out Powers

Calling out Powers

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, whenever necessary, the President may call out the Armed Forces to PREVENT or SUPPRESS:

• Lawless violence
• Invasion
• Rebellion

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The power to call is fully discretionary to the President; the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. Courts may review the exercise and implementation of that power for grave abuse of discretion and compliance with constitutional limits. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers. (Id.)

The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the President to decide. (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000)

Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to suppress lawless violence, which pertains to a spectrum of conduct that is manifestly subject to state regulation, and not free speech.

PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants PGMA the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is within the province of the Legislature. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence (David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Gen. Order No. 5 is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, that is, suppressing lawless violence. However, at the time of David, “acts of terrorism” had not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, so such portion of G.O. No. 5 was declared unconstitutional. Terrorism was subsequently defined and penalized by legislation; the current statute is the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (RA 11479, Secs. 4–12). (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

Declaration of a State of Emergency

The declaration of a state of emergency is merely a description of a situation that authorizes (the President) to call out the Armed Forces to help the police maintain law and order. It gives no new power to her, or to the military, or to the police. Certainly, it does not authorize warrantless arrests or control of media (David v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171409, May 3, 2006).

Calling Out Powers

This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution does not regulate its exercise radically.

• State of Rebellion

Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers [Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658 (2017)].

• Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Requisites for suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

• There must be an actual invasion or rebellion; and
• Public safety requires it.

Note that the privilege of the writ is suspended, not the writ itself. The writ is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court:

• If he has the person in custody; and
• His basis for detaining that person