Criminal Law › The Revised Penal Code – Book One › Criminal Liability › Participation in Acts Giving Rise to Criminal Liability › Conspiracy and Proposal
i. As a Mode of Incurring Criminal Liability
Imprudence vs. Negligence
| Reckless Imprudence | Simple Imprudence |
| As to the Nature of the Action | |
| Deficiency of action or failure in precaution | Deficiency of perception or failure in advertence |
| To Avoid the Wrongful Acts | |
| By taking the necessary precaution once they are foreseen. | By paying proper attention and using due diligence in foreseeing them. |
| As to Effect | |
| Reckless imprudence and simple imprudence under Article 365 are quasi-offenses in themselves, not merely means of committing other crimes. |
[Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 19]
PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT
REQUISITES:
- That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
- That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor; and
- Without such inducement the crime would not have been committed.
Ways of becoming a principal by inducement:
- By directly forcing another to commit a crime
- Using irresistible force; or
- By causing uncontrollable fear;
In these cases, there is no conspiracy, not even a unity of criminal purpose and intention. Only the one using force or causing fear is criminally liable.
- By directly inducing another to commit a crime
- By giving price, or offering reward or promise;
Both the one giving the price or offering reward or promise and the one committing the crime in consideration thereof are principals — the former, by inducement; and the latter, by direct participation. There is collective criminal responsibility.
- By using words of command;
The inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts where it would be the moving cause for the offense; There is also collective criminal responsibility.
Requisites to be liable as principal using words of command:
- The one uttering the words of command must have the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
- The one who made the command must have ascendancy or influence over the person who acted;
- The words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion;
- The words of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime; and
- The material executor of the crime has no personal reason to commit the crime.
There must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime. (U.S. v. Indanan, G.R. No. L-8187)
The inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed. (Reyes, Book I)
A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime. Thus, the price given to the principal by direct participation after the commission of the crime, without prior promise to give a price or reward, could not be an inducement. If the person who actually committed the crime had a reason of his own to commit the crime, it cannot be said that the inducement was influential in producing the criminal act. In such case, the one charged with having induced the commission of the crime is not criminally liable. (Id)
If the crime committed is not contemplated in the order given, the inducement is not material and not the determining cause thereof. (Id)
Conspiracy as a Felony vs. Conspiracy as a Means of Incurring Criminal Liability
| FELONY | MANNER OF INCURRING CRIMINAL LIABILITY |
| Mere act of agreeing to commit a crime and deciding to commit it is already punishable, but only in cases where the law specifically penalizes such act and provides a penalty therefor (De Lima vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781) | Conspiracy assumes importance only with respect to determining the liability of the perpetrators charged with the crime (De Lima vs. Guerrero, supra) |
| Conspirators are criminally liable for agreeing and deciding to commit a crime (Campanilla, Criminal Law Reviewer Volume I) | Conspirators are collectively liable for the crime committed in accordance with their agreement provided that they performed an act in furtherance of conspiracy to commit it. (Campanilla, Criminal Law Reviewer Volume I) |
| The conspirators should not actually commit treason, coup d'etat rebellion or sedition. It is sufficient that two or more persons agree and decide to commit treason, coup d'etat, rebellion or sedition, as applicable under the provisions penalizing conspiracy to commit those offenses. (Reyes, Book I) | Even if the conspiracy relates to any of the crimes of treason, rebellion and sedition, but any of them is actually committed, the conspiracy is not a separate offense; it is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, all the conspirators who carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution are equally liable. The offenders are liable for treason, rebellion, or sedition, as the case may be, and the conspiracy is absorbed. (Reyes, Book I) |
Elements:
- That there is a band of brigands;
- That the offender knows the band to be of brigands; and
- That the offender does any of the following acts:
- the offender in any manner aids, abets or protects such band of brigands, or
- the offender gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace officers of the Government, or
- the offender acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands
Liability of conspirators
- General Rule: When conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability is established, all who participated therein, irrespective of the quantity or quality of his participation is liable equally, whether conspiracy is pre-planned or instantaneous.
- Exception: Unless one or some of the conspirators committed some other crime which is not part of the intended crime.
- Exception to the exception: When the act constitutes a “single indivisible offense”
Under the doctrine of imputability, the act of an offender is imputable to his co-conspirator although they are not similarly situated in relation to the object of the crime. (Campanilla, Criminal Law Reviewer Volume I)
If there is community of design, the accused is liable as principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice depending upon the extent of his participation. If he performed previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime, he is liable as an accomplice. If he cooperated in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, he is liable as principal by indispensable cooperation. If the act is subsequent to the commission of the crime, it cannot be considered as an indispensable cooperation. (Campanilla, Criminal Law Reviewer Volume I; 1966 Bar Exam)
Mere knowledge of a criminal plan does not establish liability as an accomplice; accomplice liability requires knowing cooperation by a previous or simultaneous act (Revised Penal Code, Art. 18).
Updated: A participant in robbery with homicide is liable for that offense unless there is proof of an effort to prevent the killing (People v. Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, 25 March 2015).
Liability of private individual
- Cannot commit the first two acts by direct participation, unless he is an employee of a corporation engaged in telecommunications services
- Can be held guilty as a principal by inducement, if he induced a public or government employee to perform punishable acts
- Connection with telecommunications network is not necessary to commit third act; any person can be held liable for the use of falsified dispatches
Note: Current telecommunication companies like Globe, Sun, Smart are not contemplated by this article as corporations engaged in sending or receiving messages since no operator actually intervenes. They merely provide the conduit to facilitate message exchanges.
Applicability
- People incited must not actually commit rebellion for this article to apply.
- If those who are incited commit rebellion, this article is not applicable.
- Those incited would be guilty of rebellion as principals by direct participation.
- Those inciting would be guilty of rebellion as principal by inducement.
Irresistible Force vs. Uncontrollable Fear
| IRRESISTIBLE FORCE | UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR |
| Violence or physical force to compel another person to commit a crime. | The offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime. |
Offender
- Those who import, sell, or dispose of such items.
- This article is not applicable to the manufacturer of articles of gold, silver, etc. He wold be liable for Estafa.
CRAFT (astucia)
Involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused; a chicanery resorted to by the accused to aid in the execution of his criminal design. It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime.
FRAUD (fraude)
Insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a manner which would enable the offender to carry out his design.
Attack from behind is not always treachery
It must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted and the question of risk to offender be taken into account. (People vs. Baldos, C.A., 34 O.G. 1937)
Mode of attack must be consciously adopted
To constitute treachery, 2 conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (People vs. Mabuhay, G.R. No. 87018)
Authorities
- 1966 Bar Exam
- Campanilla, Criminal Law Reviewer Volume I
- De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, 10 October 2017
- Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
- People v. Mabubay, G.R. No. 87018, 24 May 1990
- Reyes, Book I
- United States v. Indanan, G.R. No. L-8187, 29 January 1913