a. Power to Promulgate Rules

Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is exclusive domain of the Judicial department and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. The prohibition on plea bargaining in drug cases under Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is unconstitutional insofar as it encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court. (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 Aug. 2017)

Q: A group of losing litigants, in a case decided by the SC, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman charging the Justices with knowingly and deliberately rendering an unjust decision in utter violation of the penal laws of the land. Can the Ombudsman validly take cognizance of the case?

A: NO. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, the correctness of the decisions of the SC as final arbiter of all justifiable disputes is conclusive upon all other departments of the government; the Ombudsman has no power to review the decisions of the SC by entertaining a complaint against the Justices of the SC for knowingly rendering an unjust decision. (In re: Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635, 14 May 1987)

Q: May the RTC or any court prohibit a committee of the Senate like the Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring a person to appear before it when it is conducting investigation in aid of legislation?

A: NO. The RTC or any court may not do so because that would be violative of the principle of separation of powers. The principle essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760, 29 July 2003)

Q: Pres. Benigno Aquino III signed E.O. No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission, a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the Arroyo administration. Is E.O. No. 1 constitutional?

A: NO. The President had authority to create the Truth Commission by executive order, but E.O. No. 1 was unconstitutional because its selective focus on the previous administration violated equal protection. (Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 07 Dec. 2010)

Q: Amog was elected Congressman. Before the end of her first year in office, she inflicted physical injuries on a colleague, Camille Gonzales, in the course of a heated debate. Charges were filed in court against her as well as in the House Ethics Committee. Later, the HoR, dividing along party lines, voted to expel her. Claiming that her expulsion was railroaded and tainted by bribery, she filed a petition seeking a declaration by the SC that the House gravely abused its discretion and violated the Constitution. She prayed that her expulsion be annulled and that she should be restored by the Speaker to her position as Congressman. Is Amog’s petition before the Supreme Court justiciable?

A: YES, to the extent that the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Alejandrino v. Quezon, et al. (G.R. No. 22041, 25 Jan. 1924), it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a Senator who assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behaviour, because it could not compel a separate and co-equal department to take any particular action. In Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144, 28 Oct. 1960), it was held that the Supreme Court could not interfere with the suspension of a Congressman for Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. However, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the decision to expel Amog is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Q: Joey Tribbiani was convicted of Estafa. When his case reached the Supreme Court, some Justices proposed to alter the penalties provided for under RPC on the basis of the ratio of P1.00 to P100.00, believing that it is not fair to apply the range of penalties, which was based on the value of money in 1932, to crimes committed at present. However, other justices opposed the said proposal for it amounts to judicial legislation. Is the opposition correct?

A: YES. The opposition is correct because the Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. Current estafa thresholds and penalties must, however, be determined under the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 10951.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co- equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 Apr. 2014)

In Commission on Audit v. Hon. Pampilo (G.R. Nos. 188760, 189660, and 189333, 30 June 2020, J. Hernando) the Court ruled that it is the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that has the sole power and authority to monitor, investigate, and endorse the filing of complaints, if necessary, against oil companies. And considering that the remedy against cartelization is already provided by law, the public respondent trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 and allowed private respondent Cabigao, a certified public accountant, to become part of the panel of examiners. Clearly, the RTC not only failed to uphold the law but worse, he contravened the law.

Updated: The DOJ may issue rules for preliminary investigation and inquest as prosecutorial functions, while the Supreme Court retains authority over its own Rule 112 (Re: Draft DOJ-NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigation and Inquest Proceedings, A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, 28 May 2024).

Rule Making Power

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period of filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. It’s rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988)

1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 18; art. VII, sec. 16; art. VIII, sec. 8

> Art. VI, SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

> Art. VII, SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

> Art. VIII, SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

The Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the:

• Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
• Pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
• Admission to the practice of law
• The Integrated Bar
• Legal assistance to the underprivileged

Limitations on Judicial Rule-Making:

• It should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.
• It should be uniform for all courts of the same grade.
• It should not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. (Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, Feb. 1, 2006).

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, Aug. 15, 2017)

The rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. Sec. 23 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, which states that “[a]ny person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining,” is unconstitutional as it encroaches on the constitutional rule-making power of the Court. (Id.)

A legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under RA 8291 was held to be unconstitutional since the payment of legal fees is an integral part of the rules promulgated by the court pursuant to its rule-making power under the Constitution. The other branches cannot trespass upon this prerogative by enacting laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules (Re: Petition for Recognition of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08- 2-01-0, Feb. 11, 2010).

Rule-making power also includes the inherent power to suspend its own rules in particular cases in the interest of justice. (Philippine Blooming Mills Employment v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)

The constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003)

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER LOWER COURTS (PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, § 6.)

The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.

Administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically, but without interference with day-today activities. Thus, to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as prescribed by the Constitution, P.D. No. 828, as amended, created the Office of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of the several offices in the Office of the Court Administrator is it provided that the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case already pending with another court. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. (Ampong v CSC, G.R. No. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008)

It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)

Thus:

• The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It cannot compel the Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter. (Id.)
• The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. (Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001)

The CSC must likewise bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA. However, such employee may be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC under specific circumstances. (Ampong v CSC, G.R. No. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008)

Separately from its administrative supervision under Article VIII, Section 6, the Supreme Court has the following powers under Article VIII, Section 5:

• Power to temporarily assign lower court judges to other stations in the public interest; such assignment shall not exceed six (6) months without the consent of the judge concerned (PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, § 5(3).)
• Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice (PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, § 5(4).)

The administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction. The Court may transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. (Agcaoili v. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

POWER TO DISCIPLINE (PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, § 11.)

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Decisions of the SC on disciplinary cases en banc is needed only when the penalty imposed is dismissal of a judge, disbarment of a lawyer, suspension of either for more than 1 year or a fine exceeding 10,000 pesos. Otherwise, the case may be decided by a division. (People v. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995)

The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency. (In Re Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, Feb. 24, 2009)

Updated: The Court recognized DOJ authority to issue rules for preliminary investigation and inquest while retaining the power to repeal inconsistent Rule 112 provisions (Re: Draft DOJ-NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigation, A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, 28 May 2024).

To promulgate accounting and auditing rules

including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures;

Appointive Officials

The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by the local chief executives. Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to professionalize the civil service. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local chief executives from making appointments during the last days of their tenure. Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules in order to be valid. (Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. 202331, 2015).

That the Province suddenly had no funds to pay for an appointee’s salaries despite its earlier certification that funds were available under its 2004 Annual Budget does not affect his appointment, if a Certification that funds were available was issued at the time of the appointment. The appointment remains effective, and the local government unit remains liable for the salaries of the appointee. (Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. 202331, 2015).